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Abstract
This study investigates whether the possibility of engaging in house-
hold child care may exacerbate the incentives of parents and grandparents to
falsely claim disability benefits. I present an efficient implementation case
for subsidizing formal child care costs of the disabled and propose an im-
plementation of the optimal scheme that consists of capped formal day care
subsidies, non-linear income taxation and asset-testing. I calibrate a multi-
generational family model with persistence in privately observed shocks to
match key features of the US labor and child care markets, and find that day
care subsidies may lead to sizeable cost savings.
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Disability insurance and child related tax benefits are important components of gov-
ernment policy in the United States. Social Security disability benefit payments to-
talled $135 billion and made up 17.5% of Social Security benefits in 2013 (US Budget,
FY2014, Table 13.1). There were 10.1 million recipients of Social Security Disability
Insurance (SSDI) benefits and 9.2 million recipients of Social Security Income (SSI)
benefits (SSA, 2013). Child related tax benefits, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) and dependent tax exemptions, are also relatively large in scope and magni-
tude. Families’ tax savings from those two programs amounted to $104 billion in 2013
(Maag, 2013). The EITC benefited 26 million working families and made an estimated
13.1 million children less poor (CBPP, 2014).
In contrast, US price related child care subsidy programs that are linked to formal
child care costs are relatively small. Families’ tax savings from the Child and Dependent
Care Tax Credit (CDCTC) totalled $4 billion in 2013 (Maag, 2013) while the budget
request for the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) was $6 billion to support
1.4 million children in 2015 (DHHS, 2014). Meanwhile, child care subsidies tend to be
relatively large in Scandinavia (Guner et al., 2014; Havnes and Mogstad, 2011), whereas
recent policy debates in Europe expressed a desire to move towards universal day care.
The European Union stated as policy goal “to provide childcare by 2010 to at least 90%
of children between 3 years old and the mandatory school age” to encourage labor force
participation of mothers (European Council, 2002).
This study presents an efficient implementation case for subsidizing formal child
care costs of the disabled and proposes an implementation of the optimal scheme that
consists of capped formal day care subsidies, combined with non-linear income taxation
and asset-testing. The framework is a dynamic Mirrleesian one, where the government
seeks to provide social insurance to multi-member households whose adult members,
such as parents and grandparents, are subject to privately observed disability shocks.
Healthy household members may allocate their time between working on the primary
labor market and household child care activities. I employ a recursive formulation with
history dependence in privately observed shocks, where the government minimizes ex-
pected costs subject to delivering a given level of promised utility to each household and
subject to preserving the work incentives of healthy members.
In an optimal social insurance framework with private disability shocks, disability
benefits cannot be too generous or else, healthy individuals may be tempted to mimic
the disabled by not working and claim the benefits.1 With household child care ac-
tivities, healthy household members who mimic the disabled by not working, may not
only claim disability benefits, but also save on formal child care costs by looking af-
ter the children themselves. In addition, household child care interact with households’
incentives to engage in sub-optimal savings. The possibility of engaging in household
1Social Security defines disability as the inability to engage in substantial gainful activity
due to an physical or psychological impairment. Those include back pain and mental illness
which are hard to verify. Among SSDI beneficiaries, 27% received the benefits on the grounds
of musculoskeletal diseases and 35% on the grounds of mental disorders (SSA, 2012). The con-
trolling evidentiary weight is placed on an applicants’ own health practitioner, thereby making
the screening process easier for applicants (Autor and Duggan, 2006; Hu et al., 2001). The
literature has documented evidence of moral hazard in long-term disability insurance (Autor et
al., 2014; Gruber, 2000; Haveman et al., 1991; Low and Pistaferri, 2015; Maestas et al., 2013).
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child care therefore exacerbates the incentives to mimic the disabled. Implementation
of the constrained optimal allocations in a decentralized economy thus needs to account
for such joint deviation incentives. The use of child care subsidies helps to directly
counterbalance households’ child care deviation incentives by making such activities
unattractive relative to formal child care.
In the disability insurance context studied in this paper, the case for such subsidies
stem from the implementation exercise as opposed to an optimal wedges argument tra-
ditionally employed in the optimal income tax literature. In particular, the case for child
care subsidies does not involve optimally distorting child care choices in the optimal
scheme. Rather, the relevant “wedges” are those of would be mimickers, who have an
incentive to jointly deviate on their labor supply and child care in a decentralized econ-
omy. This paper shows that child care subsidies help implement the optimal scheme,
where it is as though the government could control household members’ child care, in
a decentralized economy where the government may not actually monitor household
members’ child care.
I propose an implementation of the constrained optimum with capped formal day
care subsidies, non-linear income taxation and asset-testing in a decentralized economy.
The subsidized day care is equivalent to a full price subsidy on formal child care costs
and may be provided through free public day care up to a cap at the optimal level of
formal child care use. Such scheme implements the constrained optimum for single
(grand)parent households and for multi-member households with high earnings capacity,
as though the government could control household members’ child care, when in fact,
it precludes from such monitoring needs. In the context of multi-member households,
formal day care subsidies may not only help counter the incentive issues of mothers but
also the incentive issues of related family members.
The incentives to mimic the disabled are more perverse for multi-member house-
holds with at least one healthy member with low earnings capacity. The household child
care incentives of such members interact with those of mimickers. Even though day
care subsidies ensure that the optimal level of formal child care is used, members may
still engage in sub-optimal individual levels of household child care. In the absence of
monitorable household child care, a costlier constrained optimum may be implemented
for such households, that is, one equivalent to the solution to the optimal program with
hidden household child care activities.
The quantitative exercise incorporates demographic heterogeneity across households
in terms of presence of parents and grandparents, marital status, gender, and education,
and number and age of children. The multi-generational family model is calibrated to
match key features of the US labor and child care markets given the current tax and
benefit system. The exercise seeks to quantify the government’s potential cost sav-
ings from using a policy tool (day care subsidies) that directly smoothens the exacerba-
tion of incentives caused by household child care. Such cost savings stem from single
(grand)parent and multi-member households with high earnings capacity. The bench-
mark model is the constrained optimal one where the government may indirectly control
child care activities through subsidized day care whereas the comparison model is one
where the government may not control child care activities.
I find that the proposed implementation with subsidized day care may lead to av-
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erage cost savings of 0.05% to 3.31%, relative to the case that would deliver the same
level of welfare to each household but where the government may not use day care sub-
sidies. The higher the relative exacerbation of incentives, the higher the cost savings
from subsidized day care. I find higher cost savings for single parent households and
for multi-generational households with both a single parent and a single grandparent
present. Average cost savings ranged between 0.23% and 2.2% for single mothers with
higher cost savings among less educated mothers. Cost savings for single fathers ranged
between 0.1% and 1.23%, for two parent households between 0.05% and 0.8%, and for
households with a grandparent present between 0.2% and 3.31%. Such cost savings in-
crease with formal child care costs since the incentives to shirk are further exacerbated.2
The verticalization of families due to greater life expectancy, and the increasing
prevalence of multi-generational households with children aged below 18 makes it im-
portant for policy to take intergenerational linkages into consideration (Bengtson, 2001;
Ho, 2015a). From US Census, approximately 7.5 million (10%) children lived with a
grandparent in 2010. Meanwhile, 21.1% of pre-primary school aged children with a
working mother benefited from grandparent provided child care averaging 23 hours per
week (Laughlin, 2013). Data from the Health and Retirement Study indicates that 44%
of grandmothers receiving Social Security disability benefits provided at least 2 hours of
grandchild care per week while 30% of such grandmothers provided at least 20 hours of
grandchild care per week. Grandparent provided child care has been found to increase
labor supply of mothers (Cardia and Ng, 2003; Compton and Pollak, 2014; Maurer-
Fazio et al., 2011) while child care needs have been found to influence labor supply of
grandparents (Marcotte and Wang, 2007; Rupert and Zanella, 2014).
This paper is related to the optimal social insurance literature and to the optimal
tax literature with multi-dimensional choice (Beaudry, P., Blackorby, C., and Szalay,
2009; Besley and Coate, 1995; Chone´ and Laroque, 2011; Diamond and Mirrlees, 1978;
Kleven et al., 2000; Rothschild and Scheuer, 2016). Albanesi and Sleet (2006) pro-
pose a recursive labor and wealth tax system that implements a dynamic Mirrlees opti-
mum, where an agent experiences identically and independently distributed private skills
shocks. Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006) make a case for asset-testing in a dynamic model
of social insurance where an agent is subject to privately observed absorbing disability
shocks. A´lvarez-Parra and Sa´nchez (2009) design an optimal unemployment insurance
scheme in the presence of a hidden labor market.
The paper is also related to the literature on child care subsidies. Proponents of child
care subsidies have argued for such subsidies on the grounds of encouraging mothers
to become self-sufficient, in order to counteract the disincentive effects of income taxa-
tion, and to promote higher quality child care (Barnett, 1993; Blau, 2003; Currie, 2001;
Domeij and Klein, 2012; Heckman and Cunha, 2010). There is general agreement in
the literature that child care subsidies are positively associated with higher labor supply
of mothers (Bick, 2015; Guner et al., 2014; Havnes and Mogstad, 2014). Child care
subsidies also lead to a substitution from relative care to formal child care (Havnes and
Mogstad, 2011; Tekin, 2007), and to a possible increase in the labor supply of coresident
2Pareto improvement may be achieved through redistribution of the cost savings as lump
sum transfers. I do not seek to model redistribution across the different family types but rather
focus on quantifying the efficiency gains from subsidized day care for each household structure.
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grandmothers (Ho, 2015b). This suggests that day care subsidies may lead to welfare
gains by increasing the labor supply of both parents and grandparents.
This paper studies a dynamic Mirrleesian framework in which multi-member house-
holds may engage in primary labor market and household child care activities. I argue
for the use of an additional policy tool, day care subsidies, that directly circumvents the
child care incentives of mimickers. Such subsidies may not be replicated by non-linear
income taxation or disability benefits: Whereas decreasing income taxes and disabil-
ity benefits may discourage would be mimickers, such a scheme would be costlier than
one that directly circumvents the relevant child care incentives. This study provides a
novel justification for child care subsidies that stem from an efficient implementation
argument, that is, deterring parents and grandparents from “shirking”.
Section I. describes presents the recursive formulation of the government problem
in a centralized economy. In Section II., I present a case for subsidizing formal child
care costs of the disabled and propose an implementation of the constrained optimum
in a decentralized economy, comprising of capped formal day care subsidies, asset-
testing and non-linear income taxation. Section III. describes the quantitative exercise
and Section IV. presents numerical results from simulations of the optimal policy as well
as from counterfactual policies without day care subsidies. Section V. concludes.
I. Model
In this section, I present the centralized government problem where it is as though the
government decides on the allocations of consumption, household child care and labor
supply. In Section II., I discuss an implementation of the constrained optimal allo-
cations in a decentralized economy where households make their own choices. In a
decentralized set up, agents may have incentives to deviate from the optimal allocations,
for example, by jointly mimicking the disabled and engaging in sub-optimal household
child care activities. I argue that the use of child care subsidies may help counterbalance
such deviation incentives in the implementation exercise.
The centralized set up is a dynamic Mirrleesian model of social insurance where
household members are subject to privately observed absorbing disability shocks. Healthy
household members can allocate their time between work on the labor market and house-
hold child care activities whereas disabled household members can neither work on the
labor market nor at home. Households can meet child care needs through healthy mem-
bers’ household child care or by purchasing formal child care at an exogenously given
price. The first incurs a disutility of effort cost and the second incurs a budget cost. The
framework is one where the government seeks to minimize the expected costs of social
insurance subject to delivering a given level of promised utility to the household and
subject to preserving work incentives.
A. Agents
Agents in the model are a continuum of ex-ante identical family households. I use
the terms family and household interchangeably throughout the text. Let I be the total
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number of adults in the household and denote the adult members of the family by the
index i∈ {1,2, ..., I}. For example, i= 1 could represent the father and i= 2 the mother.
I consider a finite horizon time frame with T discrete periods, t = 0,1, ...,T , during
which the household’s adult composition is fixed and child care needs may be relevant
to the family. The family household is a decision unit in the model.3
Child care needs and time allocation In each period, households have child care
needs of nt ≥ 0 that evolve deterministically over time. nt may be interpreted as the
required time that children need to spend in child care, either through household child
care or through formal child care. Healthy adults can devote time (effort) to the labor
market lit ≥ 0, or to household child care hit ≥ 0. When a healthy adult works on the
labor market, the latter earns yit = w
i
t l
i
t , where w
i
t ≥ 0 is wage per unit of labor. The
remaining child care needs not covered by household child care (i.e., the difference
between child care needs and the sum of household child care supplied by all family
members: nt −∑i hit) is purchased by households from the formal child care market at
price pt > 0 per unit. wit and pt are exogenous and evolve deterministically over time.
Preferences Family preferences are separable across periods and the future is dis-
counted at rate β ∈ (0,1). Within period family preferences are separable in family
consumption ct > 0 and effort of each adult member eit = l
i
t + h
i
t . Intra period family
preferences are given by:
u(ct)−∑
i
vi
(
eit
)
,
where u is a concave function of consumption with u′ > 0, u′′ < 0 and ∀i, vi is a convex
function of effort with v′i ≥ 0, v′′i ≥ 0. Assume that vi(0) = v′i(0) = 0.
Disability states Adults are subject to absorbing disability shocks, that is, once an
adult is disabled, the disability is permanent. Disabled adults can neither work on the
market nor at home so that eit = 0. Such assumptions are based on the fact that Social
Security pays disability benefits only for long-term total disability and less than 0.5%
of SSDI and SSI beneficiaries leave the disability rolls and return to work (42 U.S.C.
1320b-19, The Public Health and Welfare).4
3There is evidence that child care subsidies targeting young mothers may affect the labor
supply of coresident grandmothers and that public assistance crowds out family support (Ab-
bott et al., 2013; Ho, 2015b; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 2007; Schoeni, 2002). For the sake of
tractability, I assume that the family household is a decision unit (Cardia and Ng, 2003). The
efficiency case for subsidizing formal child care costs would hold irrespective, as long as the
possibility of engaging into household child care exacerbates mimicking incentives. I also fo-
cus on a finite horizon model as opposed to an infinite horizon overlapping generations (OLG)
model so as to model policy based on the current generation only. In a dynamic optimal social
insurance OLG model, efficient allocations are tied to the behavior of previous generations so
that the standard immizeration result would hold (Atkeson and Lucas, 1992; Ho, 2013), which
may be a normatively unappealing policy implication (Sleet and Yeltekin, 2005).
4The case for day care subsidies would still hold if disability shocks were not absorbing or
if agents were subject to multiple partial disability shocks or if the disabled could engage in
household child care activities (Ho, 2013).
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In any period, a family may have from zero to all members disabled. Let St denote
the set of relevant disability states that a family may be subject to in period t and denote
the state of family disability by the index st ∈ St , which captures the number and the
identity of disabled members. Note that by the absorbing nature of disability shocks,
the relevant state set in the current period, St , would depend of the previous period’s
state set, St−1. In particular, if one family member is disabled in the previous period,
then the same member must be disabled in the current period. Let pit(st ,st−1) be the
conditional probability that the family is in state st in the current period given state st−1
in the previous period. Normalize ∑st∈St pit(st ,st−1) = 1.
B. Government
The government is risk-neutral and provides social insurance to families in the least
costly way possible, while guaranteeing the family an expected utility level of at least
V . The initial promised utility, V , can be interpreted as an exogenously determined pa-
rameter capturing the generosity level of the welfare system. The government discounts
future costs at rate β = 11+r , where r is the exogenous interest rate.
Information structure The government knows the distribution of disability shocks
but actual disability shocks are private information to the household. The government
may verify household assets At , formal child care costs ft = pt
(
nt−∑i hit
)
and house-
hold members’ labor supply lit .
C. Government Problem
By the revelation principle, one can focus on a direct mechanism where in each period,
households declare their disability state st ∈ St . The government then specifies alloca-
tions according to the declared state. The optimal allocations may be solved recursively
as the government minimizing expected costs of social insurance subject to promise
keeping, threat keeping, and incentive compatibility constraints.
Allocations The centralized set up is as though the government takes all production
and assets from agents, and decides on the allocations of consumption, household child
care and labor supply of agents. In particular, in each period, for a declaration of
state st , the government specifies for all household members, labor supply lit (st) and
household child care hit (st), and allocates transfers of bt (st) to households. House-
holds then incur formal child care costs of ft (st) = pt
(
nt−∑i hit (st)
)
and consume
ct (st) = bt (st)− pt
(
nt−∑i hit (st)
)
. The government also delivers continuation util-
ity Vt+1 (st) to households that truthfully report st and threatened continuation utilities
V˜t+1 (st , s˜t) ,∀s˜t ∈ St to households that are in state s˜t but falsely report st .
Promise keeping constraint The continuation utility allocated in the current period
becomes the expected discounted utility delivered to truthful agents the following pe-
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riod. The promise keeping constraint in period t is given by:
∑
st∈St
pit (st ,st−1)
[
u(ct (st))−∑
i
vi
(
hit (st)+ l
i
t (st)
)
+βVt+1 (st)
]
=Vt (st−1) , (1)
where Vt (st−1) is the promised utility for agents who truthfully declared state st−1 in the
previous period. Vt (st−1) =V in the first period and Vt+1 (st) = 0 in the last period.
In a framework where privately observed shocks are assumed to be independent
over time, the promised continuation utility would be the only state variable that we
need to keep track of (Albanesi and Sleet, 2006; Atkeson and Lucas, 1992). With time-
independent shocks, expected utility of agents would be common knowledge in every
period. In other words, expected utility in the current period would be the same for all
agents who declared st−1 in the previous period, irrespective of whether the agents were
truthful or not, since agents have the same distribution of privately observed shocks.
Threat keeping constraints When shocks are history dependent, such as with absorb-
ing disability shocks, expected utility of agents would not be common knowledge in
every period.5 One therefore also needs to keep track of the history of disability shocks,
and of additional state variables, V˜t+1 (st , s˜t) for all s˜t pretending to be st . V˜t+1 (st , s˜t) can
be interpreted as the threatened continuation utility of agents in state s˜t pretending to be
in state st (Fernandes and Phelan, 2000). The threatened continuation utilities allocated
in the current period then becomes the expected discounted utilities that the government
needs to deliver to previously untruthful agents via the following period’s threat keeping
constraints.
In addition, in a multi-member context, mimicking households may still privately
choose a state declaration st that would maximize their current expected discounted
utility, even if they are in a different state s˜t in the current period. The threat keeping
constraints therefore capture the different probability distributions of previous period’s
mimickers, as well as their current private optimizing behavior. The constraints keep
track of potential multi-period deviations.6
5To see this, consider two agents who declared to be in state st−1 in the previous period. The
first agent was truthful while the second agent was untruthful and actually in state s˜t−1 6= st−1.
Then, in the current period, the expected utility based on the distribution of disability shocks
would be conditional on st−1 for the truthful agent but conditional on s˜t−1 for the mimicker.
6To shed more light on the interpretation of such constraints in a multi-member context,
consider a two parent household. In period t − 1, the family is in state s˜t−1 (both parents are
healthy) but declare to be in state st−1 (the mother falsely reports disability). The threat keeping
constraint ensures that the family gets the threatened utility V˜t (st−1, s˜t−1) in period t, which takes
into account the probability distribution of health shocks and the private optimizing behavior.
Consider two scenarios in period t. In Scenario A, the parents are still healthy (state s˜t). The
family still reports disability for the mother due to its absorbing nature but the family may
choose to report whether the father is disabled or not. The family therefore chooses a report
st to maximize utility and get continuation utility V˜t+1 (st , s˜t), which will become next period’s
threatened utility. In Scenario B, the parents are disabled (state s˜t). The family truthfully reports
st = s˜t and get continuation utility V˜t+1 (st , s˜t) = Vt+1 (st), which will become next period’s
promised utility.
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The threat keeping constraints in period t, ∀s˜t−1 ∈ St−1:
∑
s˜t∈St
pit (s˜t , s˜t−1)max
st
[
u(ct (st))−∑
i
vi
(
hit (st)+ l
i
t (st)
)
+βV˜t+1 (st , s˜t)
]
= V˜t (st−1, s˜t−1) ,
(2)
where V˜t (st−1, s˜t−1) is the threatened utility of agents who were in state s˜t−1 in the
previous period but declared to be in state st−1.
Incentive compatibility constraints To incentivize truthful declarations, the expected
discounted utility from truth-telling needs to be no less than the expected discounted
utility from mimicking. The incentive compatibility constraints in period t, ∀st , s˜t ∈ St :
u(ct (st))−∑
i
vi
(
hit (st)+ l
i
t (st)
)
+βVt+1 (st)
≥ u(ct (s˜t))−∑
i
vi
(
hit (s˜t)+ l
i
t (s˜t)
)
+βV˜t+1 (s˜t ,st) . (3)
Honest households get allocated continuation utility Vt+1 (st), to be delivered through
next period’s promise keeping constraint while dishonest households get allocated the
continuation utility V˜t+1 (s˜t ,st), to be delivered through next period’s threat keeping con-
straint for a household that was in state st but declared to be in state s˜t .7
Constrained optimization problem Let V˜t+1 (st, s˜t) be a vector of threatened contin-
uation utilities capturing V˜t+1 (st , s˜t), for all s˜t ∈ St . In every period t, for agents who
were in state st−1 ∈ St−1 in the previous period, the government chooses allocations that
minimize expected costs:
Gt
(
Vt (st−1) , V˜t (st−1, s˜t−1)
)
= Min
ct ,lt ,ht ,Vt+1,V˜t+1
(4)
∑
st∈St
pit (st ,st−1)
[
ct (st)+ pt
(
nt−∑
i
hit (st)
)
−∑
i
wit l
i
t (st)+βGt+1
(
Vt+1 (st) , V˜t+1 (st, s˜t)
)]
,
subject to promise keeping constraint (1), threat keeping constraints (2), and incentive
compatibility constraints (3).
Every period, the government specifies for all household members i, labor supply
lit (st) and household child care h
i
t (st), and allocates transfers of bt (st) to households,
which is equivalent to the government choosing consumption of agents since ct (st) =
bt (st)− pt
(
nt−∑i hit (st)
)
. The government also allocates continuation utility Vt+1 (st)
and threatened continuation utilities V˜t+1 (st , s˜t) ,∀s˜t ∈ St , to households for each declara-
tion of state st ∈ St . In the initial period, Vt (st−1) =V , the initial promised utility. In the
last period, ∀s˜t ∈ St , Vt+1 (st) = V˜t+1 (st , s˜t) = 0, and Gt+1
(
Vt+1 (st) , V˜t+1 (st, s˜t)
)
= 0.
7Note that by the nature of disability, only abled family members may mimic the disabled
and not vice versa so that only a subset of states are relevant for mimicking purposes. Household
members who claim to be disabled must also have vi
(
hit (s˜t)+ l
i
t (s˜t)
)
= 0.
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D. Constrained Optimal Allocations
LEMMA 1. Let (c∗t (st) , l∗t (st) ,h∗t (st)) solve the government problem (4).
(i) Production efficiency. Healthy members with wit ≥ pt devote all of their effort to
the labor market: li∗t (st)> 0 and hi∗t (st) = 0.
Healthy members with wit < pt provide household child care: l
i∗
t (st)≥ 0 and hi∗t (st)>
0; li∗t (st) = 0 when ∑
i
hi∗t (st)< nt .
(ii) No distortion of effort. For healthy members with wit ≥ pt , the consumption-
labor and consumption-child care margins are respectively given by:
u′ (c∗t (st))w
i
t = v
′
i
(
ei∗t (st)
)
and u′ (c∗t (st)) pt ≤ v′i
(
ei∗t (st)
)
,
with the latter satisfied with strict inequality for wit > pt .
For healthy members with wit < pt , the consumption-labor and consumption-child
care margins are respectively given by:
u′ (c∗t (st))w
i
t < v
′
i
(
ei∗t (st)
)
and u′ (c∗t (st)) pt = v
′
i
(
ei∗t (st)
)
,
when ∑
i
hi∗t (st)< nt .
(iii) Intertemporal savings wedge. For each period t < T , the inverse Euler equation
holds and there is an inter-temporal wedge between current and future marginal utilities
of consumption:
u′ (c∗t (st))< ∑
st+1∈St+1
pit+1 (st+1,st)u′
(
c∗t+1 (st+1)
)
.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The constrained optimal allocations described in Lemma 1 are fairly intuitive. It
is optimal for healthy household members whose wages are higher than the cost of
formal child care to work on the labor market, and for healthy household members
whose wages are lower than the cost of formal child care to engage in household child
care and work on the labor market only after all child care needs have been met. The
consumption-labor and consumption-child care margins of healthy household members
are not distorted, and the inverse Euler equation holds.
II. Implementation
The efficiency argument for subsidizing the formal child care costs of the disabled stem
from the implementation of the constrained optimum in a decentralized economy. I
discuss how households would behave if they could deviate from the optimal allocations,
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and what policy tools can provide agents with the right incentives to counteract such
deviations incentives. In particular, I show that if agents could deviate from the socially
optimal level of household child care, then the incentives of healthy household members
to mimic the disabled would be exacerbated since they can then claim disability benefits
and also save on formal child care costs. In addition, household child care incentives
interact with households’ incentives to engage in sub-optimal savings, resulting in triple
deviation incentives to (i) mimic the disabled, (ii) engage in sub-optimal savings, and
(iii) engage in sub-optimal household child care.
I next propose an implementation of the constrained optimum in a decentralized
economy through the use of capped formal day care subsidies, asset-testing and non-
linear income taxation. The subsidized day care is equivalent to a full price subsidy
on formal child care costs and may be provided through free public day care capped
at the optimal level of formal child care use. Such scheme implements the constrained
optimum for single (grand)parent households and for multi-member households with
high earnings capacity, as though the government could control household members’
child care, when in fact, it precludes from such monitoring needs. The incentives to
mimic the disabled are more perverse for multi-member households with at least one
healthy member with low earnings capacity. A costlier constrained optimum, equivalent
to the solution to the optimal program with hidden household child care activities, may
be implemented for such households.
A. Private Deviation Incentives
Child Care Deviation Incentives
Suppose that household members could deviate from the optimal level of household
child care. Households take as given the allocations of transfers b∗t (st), and labor supply
li∗t (st) ,∀i, specified by the government from the constrained optimal problem (4). The
household then chooses household child care to maximize expected utility.
Illustration with T = 1 and I = 1 Consider the private problem of an agent who is
healthy (state s) but declares to be disabled (state s˜). Let c˜(s˜,s) and h˜(s˜,s) respectively
denote consumption and household child care of an agent in state s claiming to be in
state s˜. The agent solves:
Max
c˜(s˜,s),h˜(s˜,s)
u(c˜(s˜,s))− v(h˜(s˜,s)) ,
subject to the budget constraint: c˜(s˜,s) + p
(
n− h˜(s˜,s)) = b∗ (s˜) . b∗ (s˜) are the con-
strained optimal transfers allocated to a disabled agent. The transfers are equal to
the constrained optimal levels of consumption and cost of formal child care: b∗ (s˜) =
c∗ (s˜)+ p(n−h∗ (s˜)) = c∗ (s˜)+ pn (since h∗ (s˜) = 0 for a disabled agent).
The private consumption-child care margin of the agent is given by:
u′ (c˜(s˜,s)) p = v′
(
h˜(s˜,s)
)
.
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A healthy agent will engage in household child care when mimicking the disabled.
By engaging in household child care, the agent can save on formal child care costs and
enjoy higher consumption of: c˜(s˜,s) = c∗ (s˜)+ ph˜(s˜,s). In particular, consumption in-
creases by the value of household child care. Thus, the maximized utility of a mimicker
is greater than the constrained optimal one: u(c˜(s˜,s))− v(h˜(s˜,s)) > u(c∗ (s˜)) , where
the right hand side of the inequality takes into account the fact that effort cost v(0) = 0.
Now, in the case of one agent, the incentive constraint preventing a healthy agent from
mimicking a disabled agent is binding at the constrained optimum:
u(c∗ (s))− v(l∗ (s)+h∗ (s)) = u(c∗ (s˜)) . (5)
It follows that the incentive constraint (5) is violated if a mimicker may engage in sub-
optimal household child care activities.
Implications for subsidizing formal child care The private incentives to mimic the
disabled are exacerbated in the presence of household child care activities, which make
the incentive constraints harder to satisfy. Child care subsidies on formal child care costs
may therefore help smoothen the exacerbation of incentives by making household child
care less attractive to mimickers.
Consider the illustration example above with T = 1 and I = 1. A full subsidy on
formal child care costs incurred by disabled agents, coupled with an equivalent decrease
in the transfers provided to the disabled, would ensure that agents do not engage in any
household child care when mimicking the disabled. In particular, consider a disability
transfer scheme that subsidizes the price of formal child care at a rate of τ = 1 and that
transfers b(s˜) = b∗ (s˜)− τ pn to the disabled.
A truly disabled agent uses full time formal child care and therefore gets total subsi-
dies of τ pn whereas disability transfers decrease by the full subsidy amount. The budget
constraint of a truly disabled agent is therefore given by:
c(s˜)︸︷︷︸
Consumption
+ pn︸︷︷︸
Formalchildcarecost
− τ pn︸︷︷︸
Childcaresubsidies
= b(s˜)︸︷︷︸
Disability transfers
.
It follows that the disabled agent’s consumption is still the same as in the constrained
optimum: c(s˜) = b(s˜) = b∗ (s˜)− τ pn = c∗ (s˜)+ pn− τ pn = c∗ (s˜). The truly disabled
agent therefore gets the same utility as in the constrained optimum: u(c∗ (s˜)).
Now, a mimicker also gets a full subsidy rate τ = 1 on formal child care such that
the subsidized price is: (1− τ) p = 0. The mimicker will therefore not engage in any
household child care. Consumption of the mimicker is equal to the constrained optimal
one, c˜(s˜,s) = c∗ (s˜), and utility is the same as in the constrained optimum, u(c∗ (s˜)). It
follows that the incentive compatibility constraint (5) is satisfied under such a scheme.
The use of a full price subsidy on formal child care costs discourages the mimicker
from engaging in sub-optimal household child care activities when mimicking the dis-
abled. In the meantime, the decrease in disability transfers by the amount of total child
care subsidies paid, helps maintain the cost of the program to the government. Thus,
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rather than providing disability transfers as a lump sum payment b∗ (s˜), providing child
care subsidies at a rate of τ = 1 to the disabled and equivalently lower disability transfers
b(s˜) help implement the constrained optimal allocations.
An alternative scheme is to provide subsidized day care to both healthy and disabled
agents up to the optimal level of formal day care use, and decrease the transfers provided
to agents by the cost of formal day care. In particular, disabled agents benefit from free
formal day care up to f ∗ (s˜) = pn and get reduced transfers of b(s˜) = b∗ (s˜)− f ∗ (s˜).
This is equivalent to the scheme with a full subsidy on the price of formal child care for
the disabled. Healthy agents also benefit from free day care up to f ∗ (s) = p(n−h∗ (s))
and get reduced transfers of b(s) = b∗ (s)− f ∗ (s). Healthy agents still engage in the
optimal levels of labor supply and household child care. Consumption of healthy agents
are also at the optimal level and the incentive compatibility constraint (5) holds.
Triple Deviation Incentives
The incentives of agents to deviate from the optimal level of savings are well-known
(Golosov and Tsyvinski, 2006; Kocherlakota, 2010) and not delved in detail here. The
incentives to engage in sub-optimal savings interact with the incentives to engage in
sub-optimal household child care and increase the utility that households may get when
mimicking the disabled, thereby resulting in triple deviation incentives.
Illustration with T = 2 and I = 1 Consider the problem of an agent who is healthy
(state s0) in period t = 0 and may be healthy (state s1) or disabled (state s˜1) in period t =
1. Suppose that the agent always claims to be disabled in the second period. The agent
takes as given the allocations of transfers b∗t (st) = c∗t (st) + pt (nt−h∗t (st)) and labor
supply l∗t (st) specified by the government ∀t,st from the constrained optimal problem
(4). The agent then privately chooses consumption, household child care and assets
A1 (s0) ∈ R to maximize expected utility:
Max
c,h,A
u(c0 (s0))− v(l∗0 (s0)+h0 (s0))
+β
{
pi1 (s1,s0)
[
u(c˜1 (s˜1,s1))− v
(
h˜1 (s˜1,s1)
)]
+pi1 (s˜1,s0) [u(c1 (s˜1))]
}
,
subject to the budget constraints in period 0, in period 1 if healthy and in period 1 if
disabled, respectively:
c0 (s0)+ p0 (n0−h0 (s0))+A1 (s0) = b∗0 (s0) ,
c˜1 (s˜1,s1)+ p1
(
n1− h˜1 (s˜1,s1)
)
= b∗1 (s˜1)+(1+ r)A1 (s0) ,
c1 (s˜1)+ p1n1 = b∗1 (s˜1)+(1+ r)A1 (s0) .
The agent’s private Euler equation is given by:
u′ (c0 (s0)) = pi1 (s1,s0)u′ (c˜1 (s˜1,s1))+pi1 (s˜1,s0)u′ (c1 (s˜1)) .
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This is in contrast to the socially optimal intertemporal wedge from Lemma 1(iii).
Households have an incentive to underconsume and oversave in the first period relative
to the social optimum: c0 (s0) < c∗0 (s0) and A1 (s0) > 0. Note that the transfer scheme
considered implies zero household savings at the optimum. One may consider alterna-
tive transfer and non-zero savings schemes that deliver the same net present value of
transfers to households. For example, b∗0 (s0) = c
∗
0 (s0)+ p0 (n0−h∗0 (s0))+A∗1 (s0) and
b∗1 (s1) = c
∗
1 (s1)+ p1 (n1−h∗1 (s1))− (1+ r)A∗1 (s0) for s1 ∈ S1 and A∗1 (s0) ∈ R. The in-
centive to underconsume and oversave in the first period would still be present due to
the socially optimal inter-temporal wedge: c0 (s0)< c∗0 (s0) and A1 (s0)> A
∗
1 (s0).
The incentives to oversave interact with the incentive to overprovide household child
care in the first period. In particular, if c0 (s0)< c∗0 (s0), then the private marginal benefit
from household child care is greater than the socially optimal one:
u′ (c0 (s0)) p0− v′ (l∗0 (s0)+h0 (s0))> u′ (c∗0 (s0)) p0− v′ (l∗0 (s0)+h∗0 (s0)) ,
where the right hand side of the inequality corresponds to the optimal consumption-child
care margin from Lemma 1(ii). Households therefore have an incentive to increase
household child care h0 (s0) beyond the optimal level h∗0 (s0). In addition, a falsely
disabled agent would want to engage in household child care activities as explained
above. The agent therefore oversaves in the first period and engages in higher than
optimal household child care activities in both periods.
With triple deviation incentives, the agent gets higher utility when (i) mimicking the
disabled, (ii) oversaving and (iii) overproviding household child care. Implementation
of the constrained optimal allocations in a decentralized economy thus require policy
tools that would preclude agents from engaging in sub-optimal levels of savings and
household child care.
B. Implementation of the Constrained Optimal Allocations
I now show that a combination of capped formal day care subsidies, non-linear income
taxation and asset-testing implement the constrained optimum in a decentralized econ-
omy for single adult households and for multi-member households with high earnings
capacity. Note that there is a direct mapping between earnings yit = w
i
t l
i
t ∀i, formal child
care costs ft and disability claims st . The policy tools may therefore be modelled as
functions of earnings and formal child care costs. For the ease of exposition, I stick to
the direct mechanism notation.
Decentralized Household Problem Consider a household in state st . When claiming
state s˜t , the household needs to provide labor supply li∗t (s˜t) ∀i and face the associated
policy scheme. The household problem can be solved in two steps: (i) For each possible
state claim s˜t ∈ St , the household chooses consumption c˜t (s˜t ,st), household child care
h˜it (s˜t ,st) ∀i, and assets A˜t+1 (s˜t ,st) that maximize utility, and (ii) the household claims
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the state that yields the highest utility.
U˜st (s˜t−1,st−1) = Maxs˜t∈St
{
Max
c˜t(s˜t ,st),h˜it(s˜t ,st),A˜t+1(s˜t ,st)
u(c˜t (s˜t ,st))−∑
i
vi
(
li∗t (s˜t)+ h˜
i
t (s˜t ,st)
)
+β ∑
st+1∈St+1
pit+1 (st+1,st)U˜st+1 (s˜t ,st)
}
,
subject to the household budget constraints ∀s˜t ∈ St
c˜t (s˜t ,st)+ It
(
pt ,nt ,∑
i
h˜it (s˜t ,st) , f
∗
t (st)
)
+ A˜t+1 (s˜t ,st)
=∑
i
wit l
i∗
t (s˜t)−Tt (s˜t)+(1+ r) A˜t (s˜t−1,st−1) .
It
(
pt ,nt ,∑i h˜it (s˜t ,st) , f ∗t (st)
)
represents subsidized formal child care costs and Tt (s˜t) are
net income taxes.
A policy scheme implements the constrained optimum if household choices coin-
cide with the optimal allocations (c∗t (st) , l∗t (st) ,h∗t (st)), ∀t,st . Proposition 2 outlines
a simplistic scheme with free capped day care provision and asset limits set at zero.
Alternative day care subsidies and non-zero asset limits are then discussed.
PROPOSITION 1. The following scheme implements the constrained optimum
from the government problem (4) for single adult households and for multi-member
households with wit ≥ pt ∀i.
(i) Subsidized formal day care Households benefit from free day care capped at the
optimal level of formal child care, ∀t,st :
f ∗t (st) = p
(
nt−∑
i
hi∗t (st)
)
.
(ii) Non-linear income taxes and asset-testing The government imposes net taxes
and asset-testing, ∀t,st :
Tt (st) =
{
∑i wit li∗t (st)− c∗t (st) if At (st−1)≤ 0
∑i wit li∗t (st)− c∗t (st)+(1+ r)At (st−1) if At (st−1)> 0 .
Proof: See Appendix B.
The implementation may be summarized as follows. Subsidized formal day care
ensures that households engage in the optimal level of household child care while asset-
testing ensures that households engage in the optimal level of savings. Once households
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engage in the optimal levels of child care and savings, the non-linear income taxes en-
sure that households get the optimal level of consumption. It follows that the promise
keeping (1), threat keeping (2) and incentive compatibility (3) constraints hold, thereby
delivering social insurance in the least costly way possible.
Day care subsidies Subsidized day care capped at the optimal level of formal child
care makes household child care beyond the constrained optimal level relatively unattrac-
tive to households. Subsidized day care may be implemented through direct reimburse-
ments to day care centers up to f ∗t (st) or equivalently, through a full price subsidy on
formal child care at a rate of τ = 1 and with the total subsidy capped at f ∗t (st). If
follows that household child care beyond the constrained optimal level would not help
households save on formal child care costs, while it would be costly in terms of effort.
Households would therefore be discouraged from engaging in non-optimal household
child care activities. In other words, day care subsidies ensure that households choose
the optimal level of formal child care, which in turn, ensures that individual household
members engage in the optimal levels of individual household child care.
Non-zero asset limits One may construct indeterminate combinations of non-linear
income taxes and non-zero asset limits that deliver the same net present value of net
taxes to agents. In particular, given that day care subsidies ensure that households
engage in the optimal level of household child care, any combination of asset limits
A¯t (st−1) ∈ R and income taxes Tt (st) may be defined recursively from the household
budget constraint ∀t,st :
c∗t (st)+ A¯t+1 (st) =∑
i
wit l
i∗
t −Tt (st)+(1+ r) A¯t (st−1) ,
where A¯t+1 (st) = 0 in the last period t = T .
The non-linear income tax and asset-testing policy schedule is then given by:
Tt (st) =
{
T 0t (st) if At (st−1)≤ A¯t (st−1)
T 0t (st)+(1+ r)At (st−1) if At (st−1)> A¯t (st−1)
,
where T 0t (st) = ∑i wit li∗t (st)+(1+ r) A¯t (st−1)− A¯t+1 (st)− c∗t (st).
C. Implementation of the Constrained Optimum with Hidden Actions
If formal day care subsidies cannot be used as a policy tool, then the implementable
optimum would be equivalent to the solution to the government problem with hidden
household child care, which would be costlier. Such hidden activities are analogous
to hidden actions models in the optimal social insurance literature (A´lvarez-Parra and
Sa´nchez, 2009; Golosov and Tsyvinski, 2007; Pavoni and Violante, 2007).
The government problem with hidden household child care is similar to problem
(4) but with additional child care constraints. In particular, the government minimizes
expected costs subject to delivering the initial promised utility V to households and
15
subject to preserving work incentives. In addition, the government needs to explicitly
take into account private child care incentives ∀s˜t ,st ∈ St :
h˜t (s˜t,st)= arg max
h˜it(s˜t ,st)
u
(
ct (s˜t)+ pt
(
∑
i
h˜it (s˜t ,st)−∑
i
hit (s˜t)
))
−∑
i
vi
(
lit (s˜t)+ h˜
i
t (s˜t ,st)
)
,
where h˜t (s˜t,st) is the vector of household child care h˜it (s˜t ,st) provided by members in
a family in state s that declares to be in state s˜. ct (s˜t), hit (s˜t) and l
i
t (s˜t) are respectively,
consumption, household child care and labor supply of a family that is truly in state s.
Appendix C. shows that the qualitative features of Lemma 1 still hold in the gov-
ernment problem with hidden household child care. On the other hand, the government
now accounts for the fact that some of those who claim to be disabled may engage in
household child care. In particular, the consumption-child care margin of mimickers is
not distorted (while previously in problem (4), the consumption-child care margin of
mimickers was distorted relative to the private optimum).
The constrained optimum with hidden household child care would be costlier relative
to that of problem (4). Consider again the illustration with T = 1 and I = 1, where an
agent is healthy (state s) but declares to be disabled (state s˜). By enabling the government
to indirectly control household child care, formal day care subsidies help implement the
constrained optimal allocations analogous to problem (4). In other words, incentive
constraint (5) is satisfied with equality:
u(c∗ (s))− v(l∗ (s)+h∗ (s)) = u(c∗ (s˜)) .
In the absence of day care subsidies, this incentive constraint would be violated as
mimickers would engage in sub-optimal household child care activities:
u(c∗ (s))− v(l∗ (s)+h∗ (s))< Max
h˜(s˜,s)
u
(
c∗ (s˜)+ ph˜(s˜,s)
)− v(h˜(s˜,s)) .
It follows that a different constrained optimum (with hidden household child care) that
creates a larger spread between utilities of the abled and of the disabled would preserve
work incentives. As preferences are subject to diminishing marginal utility, it would be
costlier to the government to deliver the initial promised utility V .
Cost savings from day care subsidies In the absence of day care subsidies, im-
plementation of the constrained optimum equivalent to the solution to the government
problem with hidden household child care may be done through the use of non-linear
income taxation and asset-testing, defined recursively from the household budget con-
straint ∀t,st . Conversely, the use of day care subsidies help implement the constrained
optimal allocations equivalent to the solution to problem (4) for single (grand)parent
households and for multi-member households with high earnings capacity. Thus, by
enabling the government to indirectly control household child care, day care subsidies
help the government experience some cost savings for such households. In Section III.,
I quantify such cost savings for different household structures.
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Multi-member households with low earnings capacity The incentives to mimic the
disabled are more perverse in the presence of a healthy member with low earnings ca-
pacity, wit < pt . The child care incentives of such members interact with those of falsely
disabled members. Thus, even if the household uses the optimal level of formal child
care, household members may still save on total effort cost by reallocating household
child care across mimickers and healthy members with wit < pt , which exacerbates the
incentives to falsely claim disability (see Appendix D. for an illustration). In this case,
the constrained optimum equivalent to the solution to the government problem with hid-
den household child care may be implemented. Such households will not be relevant to
our quantitative analysis.
III. Quantitative Analysis
The quantitative analysis allows for observed demographic heterogeneity across house-
holds in terms of structure (presence of parents and grandparents), adult characteristics
(marital status, gender, and education) and child characteristics (number and age of chil-
dren). I denote a particular family household type by the index k which conveys all the
relevant information on household composition. The index i still denotes a particular
adult member. Each household type may be of different sizes or face different life cycle
profiles of child care needs. Adult household members may have different effort costs,
life cycle probabilities of being disabled, and wage profiles.
The qualitative results presented in Section II. are applicable to any family type. In
the optimal social insurance program, the government minimizes expected costs subject
to delivering a given promised utility to each household type and subject to preserving
work incentives. The model may therefore be solved separately for each family type.
The quantitative analysis aims at (i) quantifying the optimal allocations and (ii) quan-
tifying the efficiency gains from subsidized day care. Such gains are measured as the
cost savings from implementing the constrained optimal allocation with subsidized day
care, as opposed to implementing a different allocation without subsidized day care.
The benchmark model is the constrained optimal one where the government may con-
trol household child care (through subsidized day care) whereas the comparison model
is one where the government may not control household child care. The cost savings are
computed for each household type and may be redistributed to households as lump sum
transfers to improve welfare under a normative welfare criterion that is not delved into
in this paper.
A. Parameters
Family preferences are given by:
ln(ckt)−∑
i
α ik
(
eikt
)1+γ
1+ γ
.
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The felicity of consumption is logarithmic.8 α ik is an effort cost parameter and γ is the
reciprocal of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
Parameters to be calibrated are the discount factor β , preference parameters
{
γ,α ik
}
,
the life cycle probabilities of being disabled pˆi ikt , the life cycle profiles of wages w
i
kt , child
care needs nkt and price of formal child care pkt . I calibrate initial promised utility Vk
for each family type according to the US welfare system: Social Security and Federal
Taxes, Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit (CD-
CTC), Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF), Social Security Disability Insurance
(SSDI), and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).
B. Demographics
Household adult structure The adult structure of each household is assumed to be
constant over the time frame t = 0, ...,T , which corresponds to the finite life cycle of
a multi-generational household during which child care needs may be relevant. The
demographic composition of households is designed to match the composition of US
households from the Current Population Survey (CPS) years 2005 to 2014.
I define an adult to be part of the parent or grandparent generation based on age
and irrespective of the presence of children. Those aged 25 to 49 are part of the par-
ent generation and those aged 50 to 74 are part of the grandparent generation. To
keep the terminology simple, I refer to an adult in the parent generation as “father”
or “mother”. Similarly, an adult in the grandparent generation is referred to as “grand-
father” or “grandmother”. I consider parent households with adults aged only 25 to
49, grandparent households with adults aged only 50 to 74, as well as intergenerational
households with adults aged 25 to 74. Adults may be single or married.9
I consider a 5 period model where each period t corresponds to a 5 year time interval.
I base the life cycle of a multi-generational household on the age of the mother when
she is present in the household so that t = 0,1,2,3,4 correspond to a household with a
mother aged respectively 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49. When there is no mother
present but a grandmother is present, I base the life cycle of the household on the age of
the grandmother so that t = 0,1,2,3,4 correspond to a household with a grandmother
aged respectively 50-54, 55-59, 60-64, 65-69, 70-74. Finally, when there are neither
mother nor grandmother in the household, I use the age of the father.
I do not consider households with structures that make up less than 2% of the sam-
ple. There are thus 7 possible structures: 3 parent households (single mother, single
father, two parents), 2 grandparent households (single grandmother, two grandparents),
and 2 intergenerational households (single grandmother and single father, single grand-
father and single mother). The household structures are represented in Table 1. Parent
households make up 61% of the sample while grandparent households make up 28% of
the sample, and 11% of households are intergenerational.
8The logarithmic function is normalized by adding 1 to its argument so that limc→0u(c) = 0.
9In the CPS, a household is identified by the household number and current address of resi-
dence. Family members within a household are identified using the family identication number.
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Table 1: Household Structure
Household Adults Mother Father Grandma Grandpa Prop.
Single mother  0.13
Single father  0.05
Two parents   0.43
Grandmother  0.04
Grandparents   0.24
Grandmother & Father   0.04
Grandfather & Mother   0.07
0 1 2
1 kid 0.45 0.35 0.25
2 kids 0.18 0.09 0.05
1 kid 0.37 0.37 0.25
2 kids 0.17 0.11 0.06
1 kid 0.40 0.39 0.31
2 kids 0.21 0.21 0.13
Grandmother 1 kid 0.07 0.07 0.05 4
Grandparents 1 kid 0.02 0.01 0.01 4
Grandmother & Father 1 kid 0.07 0.07 0.05 4
1 kid 0.24 0.25 0.19
2 kids 0.08 0.08 0.06
0 1 2 3 4
Single mother 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.12
Single father 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.12
Married mother 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
Married father 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04
Single grandmother 0.15 0.19 0.23 0.23 0.23
Married grandmother 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.14
Married grandfather 0.07 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.16
Single grandmother 0.10 0.16 0.23 0.23 0.23
Single father 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.15
Single grandfather 0.07 0.11 0.18 0.18 0.19
Single mother 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Note:  Proportions computed from CPS data. Parents are aged 25 to 49 and grandparents 50 to 74. 
Note: Proportions computed from CPS data. 
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Note: Proportions computed from CPS data. Parents are aged 25 to 49 and grandparents 50 to 74.
Household child characteristics Child arrival rates are exogenously given in the
model. The interpretation of child arrival is inclusive of births of own children and
arrival of grandchildren into the household. I assume that children may arrive only in
the first three periods, corresponding to when adults in the parent generation are aged
25 to 39. The arrival rates of children vary by household structure and time period, and
are calibrated according to the proportion of households with children aged below 5 in
the CPS.
For parent households, I limit the total number of children to 3 and the maximum
number of children arriving in one period is limited to 2. This yields a maximum of
17 profiles of child arrivals for each parent household. For grandparent households and
intergenerational households with a single father, I limit the total number of children
to 1. This implies a maximum of 4 profiles of child arrivals for those households. For
intergenerational households with a single mother, I limit the total number of children
to 2 and the maximum number of children arriving in one period is also 2. This yields a
maximum of 9 profiles of child arrivals for such intergenerational households.10
I report the proportion of households with children aged below 5 in Table 2. As
can be seen from the Table, parent households and intergenerational households with
mothers have the highest child arrival rates. On the other hand, grandparent households
and intergenerational households with single fathers had the lowest child arrival rates. I
compute the proportion of households facing each child arrival profile using the infor-
mation in Table 2. For example, the proportion of single mothers who have one child
in every period is computed as a0×a1×a2 where at is the proportion of single mothers
with one child aged below 5 in period t. I normalize the sum of the proportions to for
each household structure.
Child care needs and price of formal child care I define child care needs nkt as the
portion of the working week during which child care is required. A normal working
week is 40 hours which is normalized to 1 unit of time. I assume that children require
full time child care only in the first period of their life. Since an adult can look after
several children at the same time, household child care needs are based on age of the
10Less than 6% of parent households had more than 3 children or had more than two 5 year
old children at any given point in time. Less than 6% of grandparent households and intergen-
erational households with a single father (mother) had more than 1 child (2 children).
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Table 2: Proportion with Children Aged Below 5
Household Adults Mother Father Grandma Grandpa Prop.
Single mother  0.13
Single father  0.05
Two parents   0.43
Grandmother  0.04
Grandparents   0.24
Grandmother & Father   0.04
Grandfather & Mother   0.07
0 1 2
1 kid 0.45 0.35 0.25
2 kids 0.18 0.09 0.05
1 kid 0.37 0.37 0.25
2 kids 0.17 0.11 0.06
1 kid 0.40 0.39 0.31
2 kids 0.21 0.21 0.13
Grandmother 1 kid 0.07 0.07 0.05 4
Grandparents 1 kid 0.02 0.01 0.01 4
Grandmother & Father 1 kid 0.07 0.07 0.05 4
1 kid 0.24 0.25 0.19
2 kids 0.08 0.08 0.06
0 1 2 3 4
Single mother 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.12
Single father 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.12
Married mother 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
Married father 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04
Single grandmother 0.15 0.19 0.23 0.23 0.23
Married grandmother 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.14
Married grandfather 0.07 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.16
Single grandmother 0.10 0.16 0.23 0.23 0.23
Single father 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.15
Single grandfather 0.07 0.11 0.18 0.18 0.19
Single mother 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Household Adults
Adults
17
9
Single father
Note: Proportions computed from CPS data. 
Note:  Proportions computed from CPS data. Parents are aged 25 to 49 and grandparents from 50 to 
74. 
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Intergenerational
Grandfather & Mother
Note: Proportions computed from CPS data.
youngest child and is 1 unit of time if the latter is a newborn.
Price of formal child care pkt depends on the number of newborns in the household.
I calibrate pkt according to data from Child Care Aware of America (2014) fact sheet,
which is an annual report on child care costs based on statistics from state Child Care
Resource and Referral agencies and from the latest market rate surveys. Among families
that use formal child care, infants and toddlers aged 4 were in either center-based care
or family child care homes.11
The calibration of hourly cost of formal child care for a child aged 0-5 is done as
follows. For each state, I first compute the average annual costs that a child would incur
in center-based care and in family child care home assuming that the child faces the
infant cost for 2 years and the toddler cost for 3 years. I then pro-rate the center-based
and family child care home costs according to the proportion of space attributed to each
facility type. In the next step, given 50 working weeks of 40 hours each a year, I compute
the hourly cost of child care in each state. Finally, I pro-rate this cost by the proportion
of children aged less than 4 in each state and convert to 2010 dollars using the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS) Consumer Price Index (CPI) calculator. This yields an hourly
child care cost of $3.88 per child. In sensitivity analysis, I recalibrate the model using
a higher cost of formal child care of $5 per child, which corresponds to annual formal
child care cost of $10,000 for a child in full time day care.12
Disability rates The life cycle probabilities of being disabled pˆi ikt vary according to
gender, marital status and age group, and household adult composition. I assume that
the probability of being disabled is independent across household members and across
households. The probability of being disabled is based on the CPS question “Does ...
11Family care homes are typically licensed facilities that provide paid formal child care to a
small group of children. I classify this arrangement as formal child care to avoid confusion with
the informal household child care provided by parents and grandparents in the model.
12Average hourly cost of formal child care ranged between $2.47 (Mississipi) and $9.46
(Columbia).
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have a health problem or a disability which prevents work or which limits the kind or
amount of work?”.13
Table 3: Proportion Disabled
Household Adults Mother Father Grandma Grandpa Prop.
Single mother  0.13
Single father  0.05
Two parents   0.43
Grandmother  0.04
Grandparents   0.24
Grandmother & Father   0.04
Grandfather & Mother   0.07
0 1 2
1 kid 0.45 0.35 0.25
2 kids 0.18 0.09 0.05
1 kid 0.37 0.37 0.25
2 kids 0.17 0.11 0.06
1 kid 0.40 0.39 0.31
2 kids 0.21 0.21 0.13
Grandmother 1 kid 0.07 0.07 0.05 4
Grandparents 1 kid 0.02 0.01 0.01 4
Grandmother & Father 1 kid 0.07 0.07 0.05 4
1 kid 0.24 0.25 0.19
2 kids 0.08 0.08 0.06
0 1 2 3 4
Single mother 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.12
Single father 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.12
Married mother 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
Married father 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04
Single grandmother 0.15 0.19 0.23 0.23 0.23
Married grandmother 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.14
Married grandfather 0.07 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.16
Single grandmother 0.10 0.16 0.23 0.23 0.23
Single father 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.15
Single grandfather 0.07 0.11 0.18 0.18 0.19
Single mother 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Household Adults
Adults
17
9
Single father
Note: Proportions computed from CPS data. 
Note:  Proportions computed from CPS data. Parents are aged 25 to 49 and grandparents from 50 to 
74. 
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I report the proportion of disabled individuals by household adult composition in Ta-
ble 3. As can be seen from the Table, older individuals have higher probabilities of being
disabled compared to younger individuals of the same gender and marital status. On the
other hand, single parents and grandparents were more likely to be disabled compared to
their married counterparts of the same gender and age group. I determine the transition
probabilities of households being in a given state pikt based on the proportions in Table
3. For example, a single mother has probability
(
1− pˆi ik0
)
of being healthy in period
0. For subsequent periods, she has conditional probability (
1−pˆi ikt)
(1−pˆi ikt−1)
of being healthy in
period t given that she was healthy in period t−1.
Wages I calibrate hourly wages according to the wage profiles of workers in the CPS. I
first divide gross earnings by hours of work to get hourly wages. Wages are then adjusted
to 2010 dollars using the BLS CPI calculator. 2% of the sample of workers had earnings
or hours information missing and 1.8% had wages of more than $100 per hour, which
I drop from the sample. I allow wages to vary according to gender, marital status, age
group, household adult composition and education, and take the average across each
category. I allow for two education levels: high school or less, and more than high
school education. The wage profiles of household members are reported in Appendix
Table A1. On average, gross wages for the non-retired are higher than the cost of formal
child care, wikt > pkt .
13Since disability is absorbing in the model, I also posit that the proportion of disabled indi-
viduals cannot decrease over time. In particular, if the proportion disabled is lower for a older
age group than for a younger age group, I assume that the proportion disabled is the same as that
of the younger age group. This was relevant for single grandmothers in the last two periods.
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C. US Tax and Benefit System
Social Security and Federal taxes Social Security taxes are calculated as 6.2% of
the first $106,800 earnings (SSA, 2010). Taxable income is computed as gross earn-
ings minus exemptions and deductions. Deductions are $5,700 for singles, $8,400 for
household heads, and $11,400 for married couples. Each individual and dependent also
gets personal exemptions of $3,650. Federal income tax brackets are given in Appendix
Table A2.
EITC The EITC is a refundable tax credit designed for lower income working fami-
lies. The phase-in rate, maximum credit, phase-out rate and income limits depend on the
number of children aged below 18 in the household. The income limits also depend on
a tax payers filing status (i.e., single, head of household or married). The EITC schedule
is given Appendix Table A2.
CDCTC The CDCTC is a non-refundable tax credit program available to working
families with children under 13. The CDCTC has a tax credit rate of 20% to 35% of
child care expenses up to a cap of $3k for families with one child and $6k for families
with two or more children (Tax Policy Center, 2010). The 35% credit rate applies to
families with annual gross income of less than $15k, and declines by 1% for each $2k
of additional income until it reaches a constant tax credit rate of 20% for families with
annual gross income above $43k.
CCDF The CCDF is a block grant fund managed by states within certain federal
guidelines. CCDF subsidies are available as vouchers or as part of direct purchase pro-
grams to working families with children under 13 and with income below 85% of the
state median income. I set the CCDF rate to 90% which is the recommended subsidy
rate under Federal guidelines although there are variations across states. I take into ac-
count the fact that only a certain proportion of eligible households received the CCDF
subsidy: 39%, 24%, and 5% of potentially eligible children living in households respec-
tively, below the poverty threshold, between 101 to 150% of the poverty threshold, and
above 150% of the poverty threshold but below the CCDF eligibility threshold of 85%
of state median income (DHHS, 2014). US median household income was $51,144 in
2010. The poverty thresholds for different family sizes are given in Appendix Table A2.
SSDI To be eligible for disability benefits, one must have worked for at least 5 out
of the 10 most recent years with the benefits being permanent thereafter. SSDI benefits
are based on the age at which one becomes disabled and Average Indexed Monthly
Earnings (AIME). SSDI benefits are automatically converted to retirement benefits when
the recipient is past the retirement age of 65. I assume that if a person is disabled, that
person is disabled at the start of the period and the relevant AIME is a summary of
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earnings from the previous periods. I compute SSDI benefits as follows:
0.9AIME ikt−1 if AIME
i
kt−1 ∈ [0,d1]
SSDIikt = 0.9d1+0.32
(
AIME ikt−1−d1
)
if AIME ikt−1 ∈ [d1,d2]
0.9d1+0.32(d2−d1)+0.15
(
AIME ikt−1−d2
)
if AIME ikt−1 > d2
,
where d1 and d2 are bend points. In 2010, d1 was equal to $761 and d2 was equal to
$4,586 (SSA, 2014). I use the following formula to approximate AIME:
AIME ikt =
1
2
(
AIME ikt−1+min
{
ssbaset ,yikt
})
,
where ssbaset is the Social Security base wage of $106,800. I assume that parents are
not eligible for SSDI in period t = 0 while grandparents are eligible to claim disability
benefits in the first period.14 The relevant AIME if a grandparent is disabled in the first
period is approximated from average earnings of individuals aged 45-49 with the same
gender, marital status, and education.
SSI SSI is a means-tested program that provides benefits to low income individuals
aged above 65 and to the disabled. The definition of disability is the same as under SSDI
although there are no contribution requirements under SSI. It is possible to receive both
SSI and SSDI if income is sufficiently low.15 To be eligible for SSI, countable resources
need to be less than $2k for an individual and $3k for a couple (Morton, 2014). I use
household assets as the measure of resources. SSI benefits are reduced one-for-one for
income. SSI benefits are approximiated as follows:
SSIikt = max
{
0, ¯SSIikt−SSDIikt
}
,
where ¯SSIikt is the maximum SSI benefits. In 2010, the maximum monthly benefits
available to a single individual and to a couple were respectively, $674 and $1,011.
D. Preference Parameters
The 5 year period discount factor is set at β = 0.95 corresponding to an annual interest
rate of r = 1%. The Frisch elasticity of labor supply is set to 0.5 which corresponds
to γ = 2 (Chetty et al., 2011; Domeij and Klein, 2012; Pistaferri, 2003). The effort
cost parameter α ik varies by gender, marital status, age group (25-49 and 50-74), and
household adult structure. α ik is internally calibrated to match average weekly labor
hours of working adults without children aged below 18 in the household in the CPS.
14Less than 3% of SSDI recipients were aged 25-29. Meanwhile, 75% of the working age
population are eligible for SSDI benefits with 70% of recipients being aged above 50. 53% of
SSDI beneficiaries are male and 47% are female. When SSI is taken into account, 90% of the
working age population are insured against disability (SSA, 2011a).
1585% of SSI recipients received the benefits based on disability in 2010 and 34% of SSI
recipients also received Social Security benefits (SSA, 2011b).
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The calibration of α ik is done as follows. First, define a grid of possible values over
α . Then, for each household structure, find the labor supply predicted by the model for
healthy workers, lik (α), where α is a vector of grid points associated with the effort cost
parameters of all household members. I solve each household’s utility maximization
problem by taking into account the US Social Security and Federal Taxes and EITC. I
then minimize the sum of squares of the distance between labor supply predicted by the
model and average weekly labor hours from the CPS, lˆik:
αk = argmin∑
i
{
E
[
lik (α)
]− lˆik}2 .
The average labor hours and calibrated effort cost parameters are reported in Table
4. As can be seen from the Table, the weekly labor hours predicted by the model are
matched very closely to average labor hours in the CPS.16
Table 4: Effort Cost Parameter
Data Model
39.86 39.98 0.58
41.54 41.56 0.53
39.63 38.30 0.39
43.67 44.20 0.32
37.27 37.22 0.72
37.04 39.15 0.32
42.37 43.96 0.34
38.73 38.72 0.40
41.48 41.34 0.30
43.69 43.74 0.33
39.24 39.23 0.35
1 kid 2 kids 3 kids 1 kid 2 kids 3 kids
2.20% 1.88% 1.65% 0.23% 0.54% 1.56%
0.18% 0.57% 1.23% 0.10% 0.14% 0.41%
0.11% 0.29% 0.80% 0.05% 0.07% 0.15%
0.27% - - 0.34% - -
0.20% - - 0.36% - -
0.59% - - 2.59% - -
0.27% 2.03% - 0.24% 3.31% -
1 kid 2 kids 3 kids 1 kid 2 kids 3 kids
1.77% 2.23% 2.93% 0.34% 1.01% 2.22%
0.26% 0.67% 1.68% 0.15% 0.32% 0.53%
0.11% 0.25% 0.66% 0.06% 0.33% 0.45%
0.27% - - 0.45% - -
0.68% - - 0.47% - -
0.62% - - 13.7% - -
0.63% 1.18% - 0.40% 3.80% -
Note:  Cost savings are averaged over child arrival profiles. When there are two household members, we report 
cost savings for cases where both members have the same level of education.
Intergenerational Grandmother & Father 
Grandfather & Mother
Note: Cost savings are computed as in Table 7 but with p = $5 per hour, corresponding to a cost of $10,000 per 
year for a child in full time day care.
Parent      Single mother
Single father
Two parents
Grandparent Grandmother
Grandparents
Table 8: Sensitivity Analysis on Cost Savings
Household Adults High School College
Household Adults
Household Adults High School College
Note:  α calibrated to match average weekly hours of work of working adults 
in the CPS averaged over time periods.
Single grandfather
Single mother
Grandmother & Father 
Grandfather & Mother
Table 7: Cost Savings
Parent      
Grandparent 
Intergenerational 
Table 6: ff rt ost Parameter
Hours α
Single father
Married grandmother
Married grandfather
Single grandmother
Parent       
Grandparent 
Intergenerational 
Single mother
Single father
Married mother
Married father
Single grandmother
Single mother
Single father
Two parents
Grandmother
Grandparents
Note: α calibrated to match average weekly hours of work of working adults in the CPS averaged
over time periods.
I report the life cycle profiles of labor supply averaged over all child compositions
in Appendix Figures A1 to A3. As can be seen from Figure A1, the model replicates
the life cycle profile of labor supply for working parents very closely. The life cycle
profiles of adult members in households with a grandparent are also closely replicated
although slightly overestimated especially for married grandmothers in Figure A2 and
single grandfathers in Figure A3.
E. Initial Promised Utility
The initial promised utility is calibrated for each household type according to their adult
compo ition and child composition profiles. Vk i set qual to the expected utility of the
16Recall from Lemma 1(ii) that the consumption-labor supply margin of healthy workers is
not distorted.
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household under the US tax and benefit system according to household members’ actual
health and disability status. In particular, Vk reflects the “desired” welfare level of each
family type under the current system taking into account Social Security and Federal
Taxes, EITC, DCTC, CCDF, SSDI and SSI.
F. Computation
The government problem (4) is solved by backward induction for each of the 208 house-
hold types. First define a grid over promised utility V . Starting from the final period, for
each grid point, find the allocations that minimize expected costs while satisfying the
promise keeping and incentive compatibility constraints, and find the threatened utili-
ties Vˆ that can be delivered through the threat keeping constraints. In the penultimate
period, repeat the procedure taking into account the fact that the continuation utilities
for truthful and untruthful agents will become respectively, the promised and threatened
utilities in the final period. The procedure is repeated until the first period. Given the
calibrated initial promised utility V , the optimal allocations for each possible disability
history can then be computed.
IV. Numerical Results
This section characterizes the constrained optimal allocations. Those allocations are
then compared to the case where day care subsidies are not available, thereby allowing
agents to deviate on child care in a decentralized economy. Finally, I compute the cost
savings from the optimal scheme with subsidized day care relative to an alternative
scheme without subsidized day care.
A. Optimal Allocations
Figures 1, 2 and 3 report the constrained optimal allocations for respectively single
mothers, married parents and single grandmothers, averaged over all child arrival pro-
files and education groups. The constrained optimal allocations for the remaining 4
household adult structures are reported in Appendix Figures A4 to A7. The optimal
allocations as implemented by the scheme described in Proposition 1, are illustrated in
Panels (a) and (b) of the Figures.
The solid lines in Panels (a) illustrate the consumption allocated to each household
when all adult members of the household remain healthy in all periods. A common
feature to note across all Figures, is that the consumption profile is non-decreasing
over time. In particular, consumption is strictly increasing in households with a parent
present. Similarly, consumption is strictly increasing in grandparent only households,
until the retirement period 3, after which consumption is constant. The increasing con-
sumption profiles are in line with the government providing dynamic work incentives to
agents who remain healthy and work. In particular, agents who remain healthy are re-
warded with higher consumption and future utilities, and therefore higher consumption
in the future, so as to preserve work incentives.
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Figure 1: Single Mothers Optimal Allocations
Note:  Top panels report optimal allocations averaged over all households. Bottom panels report optimal 
allocations with (τ = 1) and without (τ = 0) universal day care, averaged among households with children. 
Note:  Solid lines represent average hours from CPS and dashed lines represent average hours from model.
Note: Top anels r rt optimal allocations v rag d over all households. Bottom panels report
optimal allocations with (τ = 1) and without (τ = 0) formal day care subsidies, averaged among
households with children.
Figure 2: Married Parents Optimal Allocations
Note:  Top panels report optimal allocations averaged over all households. Bottom panels report optimal 
allocations with (τ = 1) and without (τ = 0) universal day care, averaged among households with children. 
Note:  Top panels report optimal allocations averaged over all households. Bottom panels report optimal 
allocations with (τ = 1) and without (τ = 0) universal day care, averaged among households with children. 
Note: Top panels report optimal allocations averaged over all households. Bottom panels report
optimal allocations with (τ = 1) and without (τ = 0) formal day care subsidies, averaged among
households with children.
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Figure 3: Single Grandmothers Optimal Allocations
Note:  Top panels report optimal allocations averaged over all households. Bottom panels report optimal 
allocations with (τ = 1) and without (τ = 0) universal day care, averaged among households with children. 
Grandparents are retired in periods 3 and 4. Single grandmothers have zero probability of becoming disabled  
in period 3 and 4 if they were previously healthy.
Note:  Top panels report optimal allocations averaged over all households. Bottom panels report optimal 
Note: Top panels report optimal allocations averaged over all households. Bottom panels report
optimal allocations with (τ = 1) and without (τ = 0) formal day care subsidies, averaged among
households with childre . Grandp rents are retire in periods 3 and 4. Single grandmothers have
zero robability of becoming disabled in period 3 and 4 if they were previously healthy.
The dashed lines of Panels (a) illustrate consumption allocated to a household when
one household member becomes disabled in period 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4. In two parents house-
holds, the disabled member is the mother.17 Consumption of the disabled is influenced
by (i) life-cycle wage profiles and (ii) dynamic incentives. On one hand, it may be
efficient to have lower consumption for the disabled when agents are more productive
(i.e., have higher wages). This is so as to discourage healthy agents from mimicking
the disabled. On the other hand, preservation of dynamic work incentives imply allocat-
ing higher future utilities to working agents, and therefore higher consumption when an
agent becomes disabled later in life.
As can be seen from Appendix Table A1, parents have increasing wage profiles,
except college educated married mothers whose wage declines in the last two periods.
Conversely, grandparents have decreasing wage profiles. The life-cycle wage profile
effect described above seems to dominate for those with rising wage profiles: The con-
sumption profile of disabled single mothers is decreasing in Figure 1, which is in line
with providing lower consumption to the disabled so as to preserve the work incentives
of still abled and increasingly productive agents. Conversely, the dynamic incentives
effect described above seems to prevail for those with declining wage profiles: The con-
sumption profile of disabled single grandmothers is increasing in Figure 3, which is
in line with providing higher future utilities to agents who remain abled, and therefore
17For two member households, I illustrate the more frequent situation where only the mother
or the grandparent becomes disabled. This corresponds to the grandmother in Figure A5, and
the grandparent in Figures A6 and A7.
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higher consumption when an agent becomes disabled later in life.18
There are also two forces influencing optimal labor market effort dynamics when
all household members are healthy: (i) life-cycle wage profiles and (ii) dynamic incen-
tives. While it may be efficient for agents to work more as they get more productive,
the increasing consumption profiles when healthy and the consumption-labor margin in
Lemma 1(ii) imply that it may also be efficient for agents to work less in future pe-
riods. Once again, the first effect seems to dominate the second effect for those with
rising wage profiles: Single mothers have increasing labor supply profiles in Figures 1,
in line with encouraging more productive agents to work more. Conversely, the sec-
ond effect seems to prevail for those with declining wage profiles: Single grandmothers
have decreasing labor supply profiles in Figure 3, in line with the provision of dynamic
incentives.
B. Optimal Allocations without Day Care Subsidies
I now compute the optimal allocations in the case where the government may not use
day care subsidies, but may use non-linear income taxation and asset-testing. Thus, the
constrained optimal allocations from problem (4) cannot be implemented in a decentral-
ized economy as agents may now engage in non socially optimal household child care
activities and the government may not use day care subsidies to counteract such private
incentives. The benchmark model with subsidized day care is equivalent to the solution
to the government problem (4) and the comparison model without subsidized day care is
equivalent to the solution to the government problem with hidden household child care.
The optimal allocations with (τ = 1) and without (τ = 0) subsidized day care are
illustrated by the solid and dashed lines in Panels (c) and (d) of Figures 1 to 3 and in Ap-
pendix Figures A4 to A7. I report the averaged profiles across households with children.
Optimal labor market effort profiles (not illustrated) in the case without subsidized day
care are similar and sometimes slightly lower compared to the case with subsidized day
care. The main difference stems from the fact that consumption allocated to households
where all members are healthy is higher compared to the case with subsidized day care,
as can be seen from Panels (c). Conversely, consumption allocated to households when
one member becomes disabled is lower in earlier periods compared to the case with
subsidized day care, as can be seen from Panels (d).
The intuition behind this result relates to the fact that child care needs are relevant
in the first three periods t = 0,1,2. The incentives to mimic the disabled so as to engage
in private household child care activities are therefore exacerbated in earlier periods.
Since the government cannot use subsidized day care to counterbalance such child care
incentives, the only way to incentivize would be mimickers to be honest is by reward-
ing the healthy through higher consumption and penalizing the disabled through lower
consumption. In later periods, when child care needs are less relevant, consumption of
the disabled are also higher, in line with the dynamic incentives associated with pro-
viding higher future utility to those who were working in earlier periods. The gaps in
18Note that consumption is constant once all members are disabled or retired since all uncer-
tainty has been resolved.
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consumptions with and without subsidized day care are wider for households with more
children arriving when parents are aged 30-39 and grandparents aged 55-64. For one
member households, consumption of the disabled without subsidized day care is up to
$61 per week lower compared to consumption of the disabled with subsidized day care.
The corresponding figure for two member households is $117 per week.
C. Cost Savings from Subsidized Day Care
I compute the cost savings associated with the case where the government may use
subsidized day care compared to the case where the government may not use subsidized
day care. The costs savings are computed such that both cases deliver the same initial
promised utility, Vk, to households of type k. I take the difference between expected costs
from both cases and compute the percentage cost savings relative to expected costs in
the case where the government may not use subsidized day care. The difference in costs
stems from the fact that with subsidized day care, the government may directly smoothen
the exacerbated incentives of would be mimickers by targeting their private child care
incentives. Conversely, without subsidized day care, households may engage in non-
optimal household child care activities when mimicking the disabled. The higher the
relative incentives to engage in non-optimal household child care, the more exacerbated
the incentives of would be mimickers, and therefore the higher the relative cost savings
from using subsidized day care as a policy tool.
The average cost savings are computed for each household type and range from
0.05% to 3.31%, with higher cost savings for single parent households and intergener-
ational households with both a parent and a grandparent present.19 I report the average
cost savings by education group and by total number of children in Table 5. As can be
seen from the Table, single mothers with high school education or less have relatively
higher cost savings compared to single mothers with college education. Cost savings
for the former range between 1.65% and 2.2% and for the latter between 0.23% and
1.56%. A similar pattern is observed for single fathers, whose cost savings range be-
tween 0.1% and 1.23%, and with higher savings for families with more children. Cost
savings for two parent households range between 0.05% and 0.8% and for grandparent
households between 0.20% and 0.36%. Intergenerational households have cost savings
ranging between 0.24% and 3.31%, with higher cost savings for families with college
educated grandmothers and fathers, and for families with a grandfather, a mother, and
two children in the household.
In sensitivity analysis, I recalibrate the initial promised utilities and recompute the
associated cost savings for each family type under a higher hourly cost of formal child
care of $5 per child, which corresponds to annual formal child care cost of $10,000
for a child in full time day care. As can be seen from Table 6, costs savings are rela-
19The cost savings may be interpreted as the relative information costs associated with private
household child care incentives. I also computed the information costs associated with privately
observed disability shocks by taking the difference between expected costs for the full infor-
mation case and expected costs under the constrained optimum with subsidized day care. The
information costs ranged between 0.44% to 59.35% with higher cost savings associated with
intergenerational households with both a grandparent and a parent present.
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tively higher for most household types. Cost savings range from 0.06% to 2.93% for
parent households, 0.27% to 0.68% for grandparent households, and 0.4% to 13.7% for
intergenerational households. The more expensive formal child care is, the higher the in-
centives to mimic the disabled so as to save on formal child care. The role of subsidized
day care in counterbalancing those incentives therefore becomes even more important,
thereby leading to higher costs savings.
Table 5: Cost Savings
Data Model
39.86 39.98 0.58
41.54 41.56 0.53
39.63 38.30 0.39
43.67 44.20 0.32
37.27 37.22 0.72
37.04 39.15 0.32
42.37 43.96 0.34
38.73 38.72 0.40
41.48 41.34 0.30
43.69 43.74 0.33
39.24 39.23 0.35
1 kid 2 kids 3 kids 1 kid 2 kids 3 kids
2.20% 1.88% 1.65% 0.23% 0.54% 1.56%
0.18% 0.57% 1.23% 0.10% 0.14% 0.41%
0.11% 0.29% 0.80% 0.05% 0.07% 0.15%
0.27% - - 0.34% - -
0.20% - - 0.36% - -
0.59% - - 2.59% - -
0.27% 2.03% - 0.24% 3.31% -
1 kid 2 kids 3 kids 1 kid 2 kids 3 kids
1.77% 2.23% 2.93% 0.34% 1.01% 2.22%
0.26% 0.67% 1.68% 0.15% 0.32% 0.53%
0.11% 0.25% 0.66% 0.06% 0.33% 0.45%
0.27% - - 0.45% - -
0.68% - - 0.47% - -
0.62% - - 13.7% - -
0.63% 1.18% - 0.40% 3.80% -
Note:  Cost savings are averaged over child arrival profiles. When there are two household members, I report 
cost savings for cases where both members have the same level of education.
Intergenerational Grandmother & Father 
Grandfather & Mother
Note: Cost savings are computed as in Table 7 but with p = $5 per hour, corresponding to a cost of $10,000 per 
year for a child in full time day care.
Parent      Single mother
Single father
Two parents
Grandparent Grandmother
Grandparents
Table 8: Sensitivity Analysis on Cost Savings
Household Adults High School College
Household Adults
Household Adults High School College
Note:  α calibrated to match average weekly hours of work of working adults 
in the CPS averaged over time periods.
Single grandfather
Single mother
Grandmother & Father 
Grandfather & Mother
Table 7: Cost S ings
Parent      
Grandparent 
Intergenerational 
Table 6: Effort Cost Parameter
Hours α
Single father
Married grandmother
Married grandfather
Single grandmother
Parent       
Grandparent 
Intergenerational 
Single mother
Single father
Married mother
Married father
Single grandmother
Single mother
Single father
Two parents
Grandmother
Grandparents
Note: Cost savings are averaged over child arrival profiles. When there are two household mem-
bers, I report cost savings for cases where both members have the same level of education.
Table 6: Sensitivity Analysis on Cost Savings
Data Model
39.86 39.98 0.58
41.54 41.56 0.53
39.63 38.30 0.39
43.67 44.20 0.32
37.27 37.22 0.72
37.04 39.15 0.32
42.37 43.96 0.34
38.73 38.72 0.40
41.48 41.34 0.30
43.69 43.74 0.33
39.24 39.23 0.35
1 kid 2 kids 3 kids 1 kid 2 kids 3 kids
2.20% 1.88% 1.65% 0.23% 0.54% 1.56%
0.18% 0.57% 1.23% 0.10% 0.14% 0.41%
0.11% 0.29% 0.80% 0.05% 0.07% 0.15%
0.27% - - 0.34% - -
0.20% - - 0.36% - -
0.59% - - 2.59% - -
0.27% 2.03% - 0.24% 3.31% -
1 kid 2 kids 3 kids 1 kid 2 kids 3 kids
1.77% 2.23% 2.93% 0.34% 1.01% 2.22%
0.26% 0.67% 1.68% 0.15% 0.32% 0.53%
0.11% 0.25% 0.66% 0.06% 0.33% 0.45%
0.27% - - 0.45% - -
0.68% - - 0.47% - -
0.62% - - 13.7% - -
0.63% 1.18% - 0.40% 3.80% -
College
Note: Cost savings with hourly cost of formal child care of $5 per child, corresponding to $10,000 per year for a 
child in full time day care.
Adults High School
Parent      Single mother
Single father
Two parents
Table 6: Effort Cost Parameter
Hours α
Single father
Married grandmother
Married grandfather
Single grandmother
Parent       
Grandparent 
Intergenerational 
Single mother
Single father
AdultsHousehold
Single mother
Single father
Two parents
Grandmother
Grandparents
College
Grandmother & Father 
Grandfather & Mother
Parent      
Grandparent 
Intergenerational 
Note:  α calibrated to match average weekly hours of work of working adults 
in the CPS averaged over time periods.
Single grandfather
Single mother
Note:  Cost savings are averaged over child a rival profiles. When th re are two hous h ld members, I report 
cost savings for cases where both members have the same level of education.
Intergenerational Grandmother & Father 
Grandfather & Mother
Married mother
Married father
Single grandmother
Table 7: Cost Savings
Grandparent Grandmother
Grandparents
Household Adults High School
Table 8: Sensitivity Analysis  Cost Savings
Household
Note: Cost savings with hourly cost of formal child care of $5 per child, corresponding to $10,000
per year for a child in full time day care.
V. Conclusion and Discussion
This study proposes an implementation of optimal social insurance when disability
shocks are private information in a multi-member and multi-choice framework. The
possibility of engaging in household child care activities exacerbates the incentives to
mimic the disabled, since in addition to receiving disability benefits, the household may
save on formal child care costs. Subsidized day care capped at the optimal level of
formal child care helps counteract such incentives for all members of the family. At
the same time, non-linear income taxation and asset-testing prevent households from
oversaving in earlier periods and therefore decrease the private incentives to mimic the
disabled in later periods. Calibrating the model to match key features of the US labor
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and child care markets, I find that the use of subsidized formal day care may lead to size-
able cost savings, with higher cost savings for single mothers and for intergenerational
households with both a parent and a grandparent present.
The model presented in this study is applicable to alternative home production needs
such as elder care. Indeed, as long as home production needs are important enough to
exacerbate the incentives to mimic the disabled and save on the cost of formal activities,
subsidizing the formal activities that are substitutable to home production with a cap at
the socially efficient level may be efficient. Such subsidies may be used in conjuction
with income taxation and asset-testing so as to preserve the work incentives of healthy
family members.
The case for day care subsidies would still hold even if disability shocks were not
absorbing or in a model with multiple health shocks that results in varying degrees of
disabilities. The case for day care subsidies would also hold for more general effort cost
functions that allow for differing costs of effort from labor market and child care activi-
ties, or in a model with privately observed heterogenous labor market productivities (Ho
and Pavoni 2016). While the optimal mix of primary labor market and household child
care effort would still depend on the relative wage and cost of formal child care, as long
as the opportunity to engage in non-optimal household child care activities exacerbates
the incentives to mimic the disabled, there would be a role for day care subsidies to
counterbalance such incentives.
While child care needs are defined as occurring due to the arrival of a child aged
below 5 into the household, I note that child care needs may be broader in definition.
For instance, school age children may also have after school care needs. In addition, it
is possible that some multi-generational family members, such as grandparents, provide
child care to their non-resident grandchildren. Such child care needs may also contribute
to the exacerbation of incentives of healthy family members to mimic the disabled. In
this case, the computed cost savings would provide a lower bound on the potential cost
savings from subsidized day care. Conversely, it is unclear how cost savings would
change if one were to allow for endogenous child care needs. Bick (2015) argues that
higher child care subsidies financed with higher income taxes may have opposing effects
on fertility such that child care subsidies may not influence fertility.
The model may be extended to incorporate heterogenous child care quality. The
extension is straightforward if quality is reflected in child care costs. As shown in sensi-
tivity analysis, higher child care costs may result in higher cost savings from subsidized
day care. The model would be more complicated if quality choice were not observable
by the government and if higher quality child care help improve the human capital of fu-
ture generations. Bastani et al. (2013) explore the desirability of a refundable tax credit,
tax deductability, and public provision of child care in a model with two agent’s types,
where the main focus is on motivating parents to choose higher quality child care. Cor-
nelissen et al. (2015) find that while children from disadvantaged background were less
likely to enrol in formal child care, they were also more likely to have higher gains in
terms of school readiness and health outcomes. In addition to the cost savings from pre-
venting parents and grandparents from “shirking”, subsidized day care may therefore
help encourage higher quality choices which may also result in higher human capital
gains for children. I leave such interesting considerations for future research.
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A Appendix
A. Proof of Lemma 1
To keep the notation simple, I drop the constrained optimal subscript, ∗, and loosely use the no-
tation s˜ > s to indicate that agents in state s˜ may mimic agents in state s. Let λt (st−1) denote the
Lagrange multiplier associated with the promise keeping constraint (1) for agents who truthfully
declared to be in state st−1 in the previous period, λ˜t (st−1, s˜t−1) denote the Lagrange mutipliers
associated with the threat keeping constraints (2) for agents who declared to be in state st−1
in the previous period when they were actually in state s˜t−1 ∈ St−1, and ηt (st , s˜t) denote the
Lagrange multipliers associated with the incentive compatibility constraints (3) of agents who
declare to be in state st when they are actually in state s˜t ∈ St .
The first order conditions for each period 0 < t < T from problem (4) are:
ct (st) : pit (st ,st−1)−
[
ζt
(
pit ,λt , λ˜t ,ηt
)
+ ∑
s˜t>st
ζ˜t
(
pit , λ˜t ,ηt
)]
u′ (ct (st)) = 0,
lit (st) : pit (st ,st−1)wit −
[
ζt
(
pit ,λt , λ˜t ,ηt
)
+ ∑
s˜t>st
ζ˜t
(
pit , λ˜t ,ηt
)]
v′i
(
hit (st)+ l
i
t (st)
) ≤ 0,
hit (st) : pit (st ,st−1) pt −
[
ζt
(
pit ,λt , λ˜t ,ηt
)
+ ∑
s˜t>st
ζ˜t
(
pit , λ˜t ,ηt
)]
v′i
(
hit (st)+ l
i
t (st)
) ≤ 0,
Vt+1 (st) : −pit (st ,st−1)G′Vt+1(st)
(
Vt+1 (st) , V˜t+1 (st, s˜t)
)
+ζt
(
pit ,λt , λ˜t ,ηt
)
= 0,
V˜t+1 (st , s˜t) : −pit (st ,st−1)G′˜Vt+1(st ,s˜t)
(
Vt+1 (st) , V˜t+1 (st, s˜t)
)
+ ζ˜t
(
pit , λ˜t ,ηt
)
= 0,
where
ζt
(
pit ,λt , λ˜t ,ηt
)
= λt (st−1)pit (st ,st−1)+ ∑
s˜t−1>st−1
λ˜t (st−1, s˜t−1)pit (s˜t , s˜t−1) I {s˜t = st}+ ∑
s˜t<st
ηt (s˜t ,st) ,
ζ˜t
(
pit , λ˜t ,ηt
)
= ∑
s˜t−1>st−1
λ˜t (st−1, s˜t−1)pit (s˜t , s˜t−1) I {s˜t > st}−ηt (st , s˜t) .
I {s˜t > st} is an indicator function taking a value of 1 if it is privately optimal for those in
state s˜t > st to declare to be in state st , and a value of 0 otherwise. I {s˜t = st} is an indicator
function taking a value of 1 if an agent who was previously untruthful happens to be in state
st in the current period, and a value of 0 otherwise. By incentive compatibility, such agents
will find it optimal to be truthful and declare state st . They therefore get continuation utility
V˜t+1 (st ,st) =Vt+1 (st).
(i) Healthy members with wit ≥ pt . From examining the first order conditions with respect
to lit (st) and h
i
t (st), one can rule out cases with both l
i
t (st) = 0 and h
i
t (st) = 0, when agents are
healthy and pit (st ,st−1) > 0, since v′i (0) = 0 and wit ≥ pt > 0. I now show that lit (st) > 0 and
hit (st) = 0. Suppose to the contrary that l
i
t (st) = 0 and h
i
t (st)> 0. Then, it would be possible to
decrease hit (st) by ε > 0 and increase lit (st) by ε such that the total effort of member i is the same.
The promise keeping, threat keeping and incentive compatibility constraints are still satisfied,
while the government’s expected costs decrease by pit (st ,st−1)
(
wit − pt
)
ε ≥ 0. Thus, lit (st) = 0
and hit (st) > 0 cannot be optimal. The same argument applies for cases where l
i
t (st) > 0 and
hit (st)> 0. It must therefore be that l
i
t (st)> 0 and h
i
t (st) = 0 for healthy members with w
i
t ≥ pt .
Healthy members with wit < pt . If hit (st) is an interior solution, then the first order condi-
tion with respect to hit (st) is satisfied with equality whereas the first order condition with respect
to lit (st) is satisfied with strict inequality since w
i
t < pt . Thus, h
i
t (st)> 0 and l
i
t (st) = 0. Suppose
to the contrary that hit (st) = 0 and l
i
t (st) > 0. Then, it would be possible to increase h
i
t (st) by
ε > 0 and decrease lit (st) by ε such that the total effort of member i is the same. The promise
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keeping, threat keeping and incentive compatibility constraints are still satisfied, while the gov-
ernment’s expected costs decrease by pit (st ,st−1)
(
pt −wit
)
ε > 0. Thus, hit (st) = 0 and lit (st)> 0
cannot be optimal. It must therefore be that hit (st)> 0 and l
i
t (st) = 0 for healthy members with
wit < pt , as long as all child care needs have not yet been met. Healthy household members with
wit < pt may work on the labor market only when all child care needs have been met through
household child care since there are no cost savings from reallocating effort from labor to child
care.
(ii) Healthy members with wit ≥ pt . From (i), lit (st) > 0 and hit (st) = 0. The first order
condition with respect to lit (st) is satisfied with equality while the first order condition with
respect to hit (st) is satisfied with inequality (strict inequality when w
i
t > pt). Using the first
order conditions with respect to ct (st), lit (st), h
i
t (st) and rearranging, one gets:
u′ (ct (st))wit = v
′
i
(
eit (st)
)
and u′ (ct (st)) pt ≤ v′i
(
eit (st)
)
.
Healthy members with wit < pt . From (i), the first order condition with respect to hit (st)
is satisfied with equality as long as all child care needs have not yet been met (i.e., interior
solution), while the first order condition with respect to lit (st) is satisfied with strict inequality.
Using the first order conditions with respect to ct (st), lit (st), h
i
t (st), and rearranging, one gets:
u′ (ct (st))wit < v
′
i
(
eit (st)
)
and u′ (ct (st)) pt = v′i
(
eit (st)
)
.
(iii) Adding the first order conditions with respect to Vt+1 (st) and Vt+1 (st , s˜t) ,∀s˜t > st , and
taking into account the fact that I {s˜t = st}+ I {s˜t > st}= I {s˜t ≥ st}, one gets:
pit (st ,st−1)
[
G′Vt+1(st)
(
Vt+1 (st) , V˜t+1 (st, s˜t)
)
+ ∑
s˜t>st
G′˜Vt+1(st ,s˜t)
(
Vt+1 (st) , V˜t+1 (st, s˜t)
)]
=ψt
(
pit ,λt , λ˜t ,ηt
)
.
Using the first order condition with respect to ct (st), one gets:
1
u′ (ct (st))
= G′Vt+1(st)
(
Vt+1 (st) , V˜t+1 (st, s˜t)
)
+ ∑
s˜t>st
G′˜Vt+1(st ,s˜t)
(
Vt+1 (st) , V˜t+1 (st, s˜t)
)
. (A1)
Now, adding the first order conditions with respect to ct (st) for all st ∈ St , and taking into
account the fact that ∑
st∈St
∑
s˜t≥st
pit (s˜t , s˜t−1) I {s˜t ≥ st}= 1, one gets:
∑
st∈St
pit (st ,st−1)
u′ (ct (st))
= λt (st−1)+ ∑
s˜t−1>st−1
λ˜t (st−1, s˜t−1) .
One has an anologous expression for the following period:
∑
st+1∈St+1
pit+1 (st+1,st)
u′ (ct+1 (st+1))
= λt+1 (st)+ ∑
s˜t>st
λ˜t+1 (st , s˜t) .
From the interpretation of the Lagrange multipliers, one has:
∑
st+1∈St+1
pit+1 (st+1,st)
u′ (ct+1 (st+1))
=G′Vt+1(st)
(
Vt+1 (st) , V˜t+1 (st, s˜t)
)
+ ∑
s˜t>st
G′˜Vt+1(st ,s˜t)
(
Vt+1 (st) , V˜t+1 (st, s˜t)
)
.
(A2)
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The inverse Euler equation follows from equations (A1) and (A2):
1
u′ (ct (st))
= ∑
st+1∈St+1
pit+1 (st+1,st)
u′ (ct+1 (st+1))
.
Applying Jensen’s inequality to the inverse Euler equation, one then gets the inter-temporal
wedge between current and future marginal utilities of consumption:
u′ (ct (st))< ∑
st+1∈St+1
pit+1 (st+1,st)u′ (ct+1 (st+1)) .
B. Proof of Proposition 1
Every period, households take the policy scheme as given and choose a state claim s˜t ∈ St , con-
sumption, household child care, and assets that maximize utility. From the decentralized house-
hold problem, the function It = pt
(
∑i hi∗t (s˜t)−∑i h˜it (s˜t ,st)
)
when ∑i hi∗t (s˜t)−∑i h˜it (s˜t ,st)> 0,
and It = 0 otherwise. The cost of formal child care faced by the household is positive only if
total household child care is lower than the optimal level (i.e., the cost of formal child care is
beyond the free day care cap). Income taxes Tt (s˜t) = ∑i wit li∗t (s˜t)− c∗t (s˜t) if A˜t (s˜t−1,st−1)≤ 0,
and Tt (s˜t) = ∑i wit li∗t (s˜t)− c∗t (s˜t)+(1+ r) A˜t (s˜t−1,st−1) otherwise.
Claim 1 Households have no incentives to engage in total household child care that is higher
than the optimal level. Suppose to the contrary that households choose ∑i h˜it (s˜t ,st)> ∑i hi∗t (s˜t).
Then, households do not get any formal child care cost savings (in fact, they give up part of
the free day care for which they are eligible) but need to exert costly effort on household child
care. By reducing the effort of any member by ε > 0, the household can save on effort cost and
benefit from free day care worth ptε . Thus, ∑i h˜it (s˜t ,st)> ∑i hi∗t (s˜t) cannot be optimal.
Claim 2 Households claiming a state in which optimal free day care is full time will engage in
the optimal level of household child care. This applies to households consisting of a combination
of healthy members with high earnings capacity wit ≥ pt and disabled members only. Such
households benefit from full time free day care f ∗t (s˜t) = ptnt . Household members have no
incentives to engage in higher than optimal household child care, h˜it (s˜t ,st) > h
i∗
t (s˜t) = 0, as
effort is costly and there is no scope to save on formal child care costs. In addition, h˜it (s˜t ,st)
cannot be below hi∗t (s˜t) = 0 for all members. Household members will therefore engage in the
constrained optimal level of household child care: hi∗t (s˜t) = 0 for all i.
I now get to the gist of the proof and show that households will accumulate zero assets and
engage in the optimal level of household child care. The decentralized choices coincide with
the constrained optimal allocations and are therefore incentive compatible.
Step 1 Households accummulate non-negative assets. The proof is done by contradiction
using backward induction.
Last period (t = T ) Suppose that assets carried over to the last period are negative:
A˜T (s˜T−1,sT−1)< 0. The last period’s budget constraint is given by:
c˜T (s˜T ,sT )+ IT = c∗T (s˜T )+(1+ r) A˜T (s˜T−1,sT−1) .
It must therefore be that c˜T (s˜T ,sT )< c∗T (s˜T ) since A˜T (s˜T−1,sT−1)< 0 and IT ≥ 0.
For such household choice to be optimal, it must also be that the private Euler equation
holds:
u′ (c˜T−1 (s˜T−1,sT−1)) = ∑
sT∈ST
piT (sT ,sT−1)u′ (c˜T (s˜T ,sT )) .
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Now, from Lemma 1(iii), there is an inter-temporal wedge at the optimal consumption levels:
u′
(
c∗T−1 (s˜T−1)
)
< ∑
sT∈ST
piT (sT ,sT−1)u′ (c∗T (s˜T )) .
From the private Euler equation, the inter-temporal wedge, the fact that c˜T (s˜T ,sT ) < c∗T (s˜T )
and from concavity of u, it must therefore be that c˜T−1 (s˜T−1,sT−1)< c∗T−1 (s˜T−1).
Penultimate period (t = T − 1) From Claim 1, households do not have an incen-
tive to overprovide total household child care: ∑i h˜iT−1 (s˜T−1,sT−1) ≤ ∑i hi∗T−1 (s˜T−1). I now
show that households do not have an incentive to underprovide total household child care:
∑i h˜iT−1 (s˜T−1,sT−1) ≥ ∑i hi∗T−1 (s˜T−1). Suppose to the contrary that ∑i h˜iT−1 (s˜T−1,sT−1) <
∑i hi∗T−1 (s˜T−1). From Lemma 1(ii), the consumption-child care margins at the optimal allo-
cations are given by:
u′ (c∗T (s˜T )) pT − v′i
(
li∗T (s˜T )+h
i∗
T (s˜T )
)≤ 0,
with equality when wiT−1 < pT−1 and∑i h
i∗
T−1 (s˜T−1)< nT−1. It follows that if c˜T−1 (s˜T−1,sT−1)<
c∗T−1 (s˜T−1), then
u′ (c˜T−1 (s˜T−1,sT−1)) pT−1− v′i
(
li∗T−1 (s˜T−1)+h
i∗
T−1 (s˜T−1)
)
> u′
(
c∗T−1 (s˜T−1)
)
pT−1− v′i
(
li∗T−1 (s˜T−1)+h
i∗
T−1 (s˜T−1)
)
.
Since the marginal gain from household child care is higher, household members have greater
incentives to increase household child care beyond the optimal level hi∗T−1 (s˜T−1). Thus, it can-
not be that ∑i h˜iT−1 (s˜T−1,sT−1) < ∑i h
i∗
T−1 (s˜T−1). The household must therefore engage in the
optimal level of total household child care ∑i h˜iT−1 (s˜T−1,sT−1) = ∑i h
i∗
T−1 (s˜T−1).
The penultimate period’s budget constraint is then given by:
c˜T−1 (s˜T−1,sT−1)+ A˜T (s˜T−1,sT−1) = c∗T−1 (s˜T−1)+(1+ r) A˜T−1 (s˜T−2,sT−2) .
Since c˜T−1 (s˜T−1,sT−1)< c∗T−1 (s˜T−1) and A˜T (s˜T−1,sT−1)< 0, it must be that A˜T−1 (s˜T−2,sT−2)<
0.
For such household choice to be optimal, it must also be that the private Euler equation
holds:
u′ (c˜T−2 (s˜T−2,sT−2)) = ∑
sT−1∈ST−1
piT−1 (sT−1,sT−2)u′ (c˜T−1 (s˜T−1,sT−1)) .
Now, from Lemma 1(iii), there is an inter-temporal wedge at the optimal consumption levels:
u′
(
c∗T−2 (s˜T−2)
)
< ∑
sT−1∈ST−1
piT−1 (sT−1,sT−2)u′
(
c∗T−1 (s˜T−1)
)
.
From the private Euler equation, the inter-temporal wedge, the fact that c˜T−1 (s˜T−1,sT−1) <
c∗T−1 (s˜T−1) and from concavity of u, it must therefore be that c˜T−2 (s˜T−2,sT−2)< c
∗
T−2 (s˜T−2).
First period (t = 0) By following the same line of proof, it must be that A˜1 (s˜0,s0) < 0
from the second period’s budget constraint, and that c˜0 (s˜0,s0)< c∗0 (s˜0) from the Euler equations
between the first and second periods. In addition, ∑
i
h˜i0 (s˜0,s0) = ∑
i
hi∗0 (s˜0) from the household’s
consumption-child care margins in the first period. The first period’s household budget con-
straint is given by:
c˜0 (s˜0,s0)+ A˜1 (s˜0,s0) = c∗0 (s˜0) .
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Since c˜0 (s˜0,s0)< c∗0 (s˜0), it must be that A˜1 (s˜0,s0)> 0, which is a contradiction. Thus, it must
be that households accummulate non-negative assets.
Step 2 Households accummulate zero assets.
From Step 1, the household accummulates non-negative assets. The household budget con-
straint for all t < T may therefore be rewritten as:
c˜t (s˜t ,st)+ It + A˜t+1 (s˜t ,st) = c∗t (s˜t) .
From Claim 1, households do not have an incentive to overprovide total household child
care: ∑i h˜it (s˜t ,st) ≤ ∑i hi∗t (s˜t). I now show that households do not have an incentive to un-
derprovide total household child care: ∑i h˜it (s˜t ,st) ≥ ∑i hi∗t (s˜t). Suppose to the contrary that
∑i h˜it (s˜t ,st)< ∑i hi∗t (s˜t). From Lemma 1(ii), the consumption-child care margins at the optimal
allocations are given by:
u′ (c∗t (s˜t)) pt − v′i
(
li∗t (s˜t)+h
i∗
t (s˜t)
)≤ 0,
with equality when wit < pt and ∑i hi∗t (s˜t) < nt . It follows that if ∑i h˜it (s˜t ,st) < ∑i hi∗t (s˜t), then
c˜t (s˜t ,st)< c∗t (s˜t) from the budget constraint since A˜t+1 (s˜t ,st)≥ 0. We therefore have
u′ (c˜t (s˜t ,st)) pt − v′i
(
li∗t (s˜t)+h
i∗
t (s˜t)
)
> u′ (c∗t (s˜t)) pt − v′i
(
li∗t (s˜t)+h
i∗
t (s˜t)
)
.
Since the marginal gain from household child care is higher, household members have greater
incentives to increase household child care beyond the optimal level hi∗t (s˜t). Thus, it cannot be
that ∑i h˜it (s˜t ,st)< ∑i hi∗t (s˜t). The household must therefore engage in the optimal level of total
household child care: ∑i h˜it (s˜t ,st) = ∑i hi∗t (s˜t).
The household budget constraint then becomes:
c˜t (s˜t ,st)+ A˜t+1 (s˜t ,st) = c∗t (s˜t) .
This implies that c˜t (s˜t ,st) < c∗t (s˜t) whenever A˜t+1 (s˜t ,st) > 0 and c˜t (s˜t ,st) = c∗t (s˜t) whenever
A˜t+1 (s˜t ,st) = 0. Thus, A˜t+1 (s˜t ,st)> 0 cannot be optimal as the household gets a lower stream of
consumption compared to the case when A˜t+1 (s˜t ,st) = 0. The household will therefore choose
to accummulate zero assets.
Step 3 Households consume the optimal level of consumption.
From Steps 1 and 2, the household accummulates zero assets: A˜t (s˜t−1,st−1) = 0. The
household budget constraint may therefore be rewritten as:
c˜t (s˜t ,st) = c∗t (s˜t) .
Households thus consume the optimal level of consumption.
Step 4 Individual household members engage in the optimal level of household child care.
From Step 2, households engage in the optimal level of total household child care: ∑i h˜it (s˜t ,st)=
∑i hi∗t (s˜t). In addition, from Claim 2, individual members in households claiming a state in
which optimal free day care is full time will engage in the optimal level of household child care:
h˜it (s˜t ,st) = h
i∗
t (s˜t) = 0 ,∀i. Now consider a household that claims a state in which optimal free
day care is less than full time: f ∗t (s˜t) = pt
(
nt −∑i hi∗t (s˜t)
)
. This applies to healthy single parent
or single grandparent households with low earnings capacity wit < pt . From Lemma 1(i), it is
optimal for such members to engage in strictly positive household child care hi∗t (s˜t) > 0. As
there is only one adult member, individual household child care is equal to total household child
care, which is optimally implemented through the optimal free day care.
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Step 5 The decentralized allocations are incentive compatible.
Steps 1 to 4 show that for any state claim, household choices coincide with the optimal allo-
cations. It follows that the promise keeping (1), threat-keeping (2) and incentive compatibility
(3) constraints of the government problem (4) hold. In other words, the household will choose
to claim its true state. Thus, a scheme with subsidized day care, non-linear income taxation and
asset-testing implements the constrained optimal allocations (c∗t (st) , l∗t (st)h∗t (st)), ∀t,st .
C. Government Problem with Hidden Household Child Care
I follow the first-order approach (Rogerson, 1985) and impose the private first order conditions
of agents with respect to household child care as additional constraints. Recall that ct (st) =
bt (st)− pt
(
nt −∑i hit (st)
)
and c˜t (st , s˜t) = bt (st)− pt
(
nt −∑i h˜it (st , s˜t)
)
. In every period t, for
agents who were in state st−1 ∈ St−1 in the previous period, the government chooses allocations
to minimize expected costs:
Gt
(
Vt (st−1) , V˜t (st−1, s˜t−1)
)
= Min
bt ,lt ,ht ,h˜t ,Vt+1,V˜t+1
∑
st∈St
pit (st ,st−1)
[
bt (st)−∑
i
wit l
i
t (st)+βGt+1
(
Vt+1 (st) , V˜t+1 (st, s˜t)
)]
,
subject to the promise keeping constraint
∑
st∈St
pit (st ,st−1)
[
u
(
bt (st)− pt
(
nt −∑
i
hit (st)
))
−∑
i
vi
(
hit (st)+ l
i
t (st)
)
+βVt+1 (st)
]
=Vt (st−1) ,
Threat keeping constraints ∀s˜t−1 ∈ St−1:
∑
s˜t∈St
pit (s˜t , s˜t−1)max
st
[
u
(
bt (st)− pt
(
nt −∑
i
h˜it (st , s˜t)
))
−∑
i
vi
(
h˜it (st , s˜t)+ l
i
t (st)
)
+βV˜t+1 (st , s˜t)
]
= V˜t (st−1, s˜t−1) ,
Incentive compatibility constraints ∀st , s˜t ∈ St :
u
(
bt (st)− pt
(
nt −∑
i
hit (st)
))
−∑
i
vi
(
hit (st)+ l
i
t (st)
)
+βVt+1 (st)
≥ u
(
bt (st)− pt
(
nt −∑
i
h˜it (s˜t ,st)
))
−∑
i
vi
(
h˜it (s˜t ,st)+ l
i
t (s˜t)
)
+βV˜t+1 (s˜t ,st) ,
Child care constraints ∀i,∀st , s˜t ∈ St :
u′
(
bt (st)− pt
(
nt −∑
i
hit (st)
))
pt − v′i
(
lit (st)+h
i
t (st)
)≤ 0.
u′
(
bt (st)− pt
(
nt −∑
i
h˜it (st , s˜t)
))
pt − v′i
(
lit (st)+ h˜
i
t (st , s˜t)
)≤ 0.
Let λt (st−1) denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the promise keeping constraint
for agents who truthfully declared to be in state st−1 in the previous period, λ˜t (st−1, s˜t−1) denote
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the Lagrange mutipliers associated with the threat keeping constraints for agents who declared
to be in state st−1 in the previous period when they were actually in state s˜t−1 ∈ St−1, ηt (st , s˜t)
denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with the incentive compatibility constraints of agents
who declare to be in state st when they are actually in state s˜t ∈ St , φ it (st) denote the Lagrange
multipliers associated with the child care constraints of agents who are honestly in state st , and
φ˜ it (st , s˜t) denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with the child care constraints of agents
who declare to be in state st when they are actually in state s˜t ∈ St .
Let I {s˜t > st} is an indicator function taking a value of 1 if it is privately optimal for those
in state s˜t > st to declare to be in state st , and a value of 0 otherwise. I {s˜t = st} is an indicator
function taking a value of 1 if an agent who was previously untruthful happens to be in state
st in the current period, and a value of 0 otherwise. By incentive compatibility, such agents
will find it optimal to be truthful and declare state st . They therefore get household child care
h˜it (st , s˜t) = h
i
t (st) and continuation utility V˜t+1 (st ,st) =Vt+1 (st).
Claim 3 The Lagrange multipliers associated with the child care constraints are zero. The
first order condition with respect to h˜it (st , s˜t) is given by:[
∑
s˜t−1>st−1
λ˜t (st−1, s˜t−1) ∑
s˜t>st
pit (s˜t , s˜t−1) I {s˜t > st}− ∑
s˜t>st
ηt (st , s˜t)
][ ˜f .o.c.(st , s˜t)]
−∑
j 6=i
∑
s˜t>st
φ˜ jt (st , s˜t)u′′
(
bt (st)− pt
(
nt −∑i h˜it (st , s˜t)
))
p2t − ∑
s˜t>st
φ˜ it (st , s˜t) [ ˜s.o.c.(st , s˜t)] ≤ 0,
where ˜f .o.c.(st , s˜t) and ˜s.o.c.(st , s˜t) are respectively, the private first and second order condi-
tions with respect to child care: ˜f .o.c.(st , s˜t)= u′
(
bt (st)− pt
(
nt −∑i h˜it (st , s˜t)
))
pt−v′i
(
lit (st)+ h˜
i
t (st , s˜t)
)
and ˜s.o.c.(st , s˜t) = u′′
(
bt (st)− pt
(
nt −∑i h˜it (st , s˜t)
))
p2t − v′′i
(
lit (st)+ h˜
i
t (st , s˜t)
)
. From Khun-
Tucker conditions, φ˜ it (st , s˜t) ≥ 0. In particular, if h˜it (st , s˜t) = 0, then the child care constraint
is non-binding and φ˜ it (st , s˜t) = 0. If h˜it (st , s˜t) > 0, then the child care constraint is binding and
φ˜ it (st , s˜t)≥ 0. Private optimality then implies that ˜f .o.c.(st , s˜t) = 0 and ˜s.o.c.(st , s˜t)< 0. Since
utility is concave, it must therefore be that φ˜ it (st , s˜t) = 0 ∀i,∀st , s˜t ∈ St . A similar line of proof
shows that φ it (st) = 0 ∀i,∀st ∈ St .
The government’s first order conditions are then given by:
bt (st) : pit (st ,st−1)−
[
ζt
(
pit ,λt , λ˜t ,ηt
)
+ ∑
s˜t>st
ζ˜t
(
pit ,λt , λ˜t ,ηt
)]
u′ (ct (st)) = 0,
lit (st) : pit (st ,st−1)wit −ζt
(
pit ,λt , λ˜t ,ηt
)
v′i
(
hit (st)+ l
i
t (st)
)
+ ∑
s˜t>st
ζ˜t
(
pit , λ˜t ,ηt
)
v′i
(
h˜it (st , s˜t)+ l
i
t (st)
) ≤ 0,
hit (st) : ζt
(
pit ,λt , λ˜t ,ηt
)[
u′ (ct (st)) pt − v′i
(
hit (st)+ l
i
t (st)
)] ≤ 0,
h˜it (st , s˜t) : ζ˜t
(
pit , λ˜t ,ηt
)[
u′ (c˜t (st , s˜t)) pt − v′i
(
h˜it (st , s˜t)+ l
i
t (st)
)] ≤ 0,
Vt+1 (st) : −pit (st ,st−1)G′Vt+1(st)
(
Vt+1 (st) , V˜t+1 (st, s˜t)
)
+ζt
(
pit ,λt , λ˜t ,ηt
)
= 0,
V˜t+1 (st , s˜t) : −pit (st ,st−1)G′˜Vt+1(st ,s˜t)
(
Vt+1 (st) , V˜t+1 (st, s˜t)
)
+ ζ˜t
(
pit , λ˜t ,ηt
)
= 0,
where
ζt
(
pit ,λt , λ˜t ,ηt
)
= λt (st−1)pit (st ,st−1)+ ∑
s˜t−1>st−1
λ˜t (st−1, s˜t−1)pit (s˜t , s˜t−1) I {s˜t = st}+ ∑
s˜t<st
ηt (s˜t ,st) ,
ζ˜t
(
pit , λ˜t ,ηt
)
= ∑
s˜t−1>st−1
λ˜t (st−1, s˜t−1)pit (s˜t , s˜t−1) I {s˜t > st}−ηt (st , s˜t) .
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Claim 4 The qualitative features of Lemma 1 hold. (i) Using the first order conditions with
respect to bt (st) and lit (st), and summing across the first order conditions with respect to h
i
t (st)
and h˜it (st , s˜t) ∀s˜t > st , we have respectively:
ζt
(
pit ,λt , λ˜t ,ηt
)[
u′ (ct (st))wt − v′i
(
hit (st)+ l
i
t (st)
)]
+ ∑
s˜t>st
ζ˜t
(
pit ,λt , λ˜t ,ηt
)[
u′ (c˜t (st , s˜t))wt − v′i
(
lit (st)+ h˜
i
t (st , s˜t)
)] ≤ 0, (A3)
ζt
(
pit ,λt , λ˜t ,ηt
)[
u′ (ct (st)) pt − v′i
(
hit (st)+ l
i
t (st)
)]
+ ∑
s˜t>st
ζ˜t
(
pit ,λt , λ˜t ,ηt
)[
u′ (c˜t (st , s˜t)) pt − v′i
(
lit (st)+ h˜
i
t (st , s˜t)
)] ≤ 0. (A4)
When wit ≥ pt and (A3) is satisfied with equality, (A4) will be satisfied with strict inequality. It
must therefore be that lit (st)> 0 and h
i
t (st) = 0 for healthy members with w
i
t ≥ pt . By the same
line of thought, hit (st)> 0 and l
i
t (st) = 0 for healthy members with w
i
t < pt , as long as all child
care needs have not yet been met. Similar lines of proof as in Appendix A. may then be used to
show that (ii) and (iii) also hold.
D. Multi-Member Households with Low Earnings Capacity
Consider an illustration with T = 1 and I = 2. Suppose that a household consisting of two
healthy members (state s) claims that member i = 1 is disabled. Suppose that w2 < p. I now
show that the exacerbation of incentives to mimic the disabled still exists despite the household
benefiting from free day care of f ∗ (s) = p
(
n−h2∗ (s)). This is because the falsely disabled
member i = 1 has incentives to engage in household child care activities, which would enable
the healthy member i = 2 to spend less effort on household child care. Let ε ≥ 0 be the increase
(decrease) in household child care of member i = 1 (i = 2). The mimicker household solves:
Max
ε
u(c(s˜,s))− v1 (ε)− v2
(
l2∗ (s˜)+h2∗ (s˜)− ε) ,
subject to the budget constraint: c˜(s˜,s)=w2l2∗ (s˜)−T (s˜) , where income tax T (s˜)=w2l2∗ (s˜)−
c∗ (s˜). Thus, c˜(s˜,s) = c∗ (s˜). The private first order condition of the household is given by:
−v′1 (ε)+ v′2
(
l2∗ (s˜)+h2∗ (s˜)− ε)≤ 0,
with strict inequality when ε = 0. But then, since v′1 (0) = 0 and l
2∗ (s˜) + h2∗ (s˜) > 0 from
Lemma 1(i), we cannot have strict inequality. It must therefore be that ε > 0.20 It follows that
the utility that the mimicker household gets in deviation is higher than the constrained optimal
one, which still exacerbates the incentive constraint.
20Note that the result would hold even if v′1 (0) > 0, provided that the effort cost functions
are convex enough. In other words, as long as the incremental effort cost of household member
i = 1 is lower than that of household member i = 2, it would be privately optimal to have ε > 0.
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Table A1: Hourly Wages
0 1 2 3 4
High School 12.04 12.86 13.85 14.11 14.65
College 15.80 18.13 20.59 22.14 23.74
High School 15.47 16.37 18.30 19.03 19.39
College 20.13 23.28 25.49 27.48 28.78
High School 13.04 14.00 14.95 15.16 15.23
College 19.94 23.71 25.42 25.01 24.71
High School 16.78 18.78 20.30 21.15 21.76
College 23.67 28.81 32.38 33.94 34.54
High School 14.84 14.47 14.03 - -
College 24.26 24.22 23.33 - -
High School 15.89 16.22 15.62 - -
College 25.22 25.10 24.30 - -
High School 22.39 21.87 21.16 - -
College 34.40 33.24 32.23 - -
High School 15.22 15.04 13.77 - -
College 24.19 22.95 22.91 - -
High School 13.47 14.78 16.03 18.04 20.99
College 17.85 19.78 24.49 26.71 32.26
High School 21.73 21.05 20.94 - -
College 33.77 33.11 33.07 - -
High School 11.99 12.54 13.98 14.93 15.61
College 16.85 18.72 23.55 23.99 25.06
Table 4: Hourly Wages
Education
t
Parent Single mother
Single father
Adults
Note:  Hourly wage in 2010 dollars computed by dividing gross earnings by hours of work from CPS data. I 
take the mean across adults for each household structure and education level. Grandparents are retired in 
periods 3 and 4. 
Household
Married father
Grandparent Single grandmother
Married grandmother
Married grandfather
Intergenerational Single grandmother
Single father
Married mother
Single mother
Single grandfather
Note: Hourly wage in 2010 dollars computed by dividing gross earnings by hours of work from
CPS data. I take the mean across adults for each household structure and education level. Grand-
parents are retired in periods 3 and 4.
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Table A2: 2010 US Tax and Benefit System
Federal Income Tax Rates a
10% Less than $8,375 Less than $11,950 Less than $16,750
15% $8,375 - $34,000 $11,950 - $45,550 $16,750 - $68,000
25% $34,000 - $82,400 $45,550 - $117,650 $68,000 - $137,300
28% $82,400 - $171,850 $117,650 - $190,550 $137,300 - $209,250
33% $171,850 - $373,650 $190,550 - $373,650 $209,250 - $373,650
35% $373,650 and above $373,650 and above $373,650 and above
EITC b
0 7.65% $457 7.65% $7,480 $13,460 $12,480 $18,470
1 34% $3,050 15.98% $16,450 $35,535 $21,460 $40,545
2 40% $5,036 21.06% $16,450 $40,363 $21,460 $45,373
3 or more 45% $5,666 21.06% $16,450 $43,352 $21,460 $48,362
Poverty Thresholds c
1 2 3
Two people $15,030
Three people $17,552 $17,568
Four people $22,859 $22,113 $22,190
Five people $27,518 $26,675 $26,023
                                                    
Tax rate Taxable income
Single Head Married
No. of Children below 18Size of family unit
Sources: ahttp://www.moneychimp.com. bHistorical Earned Income Tax Credit 
Parameters, Tax Policy Center. Phase-out income for married filing jointly status computed 
by author based on phase-out rate and income limit. cU.S. Census Bureau.
Table 5: 2010  ax and Benefit System
# Children 
below 18
All Filing Status Single and Head Married
Income    
Limit
Maximum 
Credit
Phase-out 
rate
Phase-in   
rate
Phase-out 
Income
Income    
Limit
Phase-out 
Income
Sources: a. http://www.moneychimp.com. b. Historical Earned Income Tax Credit Parameters,
Tax Policy Center. Phase-out income for married filing jointly status computed by author based
on phase-out rate and income limit. c. U.S. Census Bureau.
Filing status Federal income tax brackets depend on a tax payers filing status. I assume that
households with a single parent or grandparent file taxes under the single status when there are
no children present in the household and file under the head of household status when there are
children below 18 present. Married households, on the other hand, file jointly for taxes irre-
spective of presence of children. For intergenerational households with children aged below 18,
I assume that the grandparent files as head of household while the parent files under the single
status. If the grandparent is disabled or retired, then the parent files as the head of household. To
qualify as head of household, one must be unmarried, provide for more than half of housing ex-
penses, and have a qualifying dependent who may be a descendant aged below 18 or a disabled
relative of any age (Inland Revenue Service).
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Figure A1: Parent Households Labor Supply
Note:  Solid lines represent average hours from CPS and dashed lines represent average hours from model.Note: Solid lines represent average hours from CPS and dashed lines represent average hours from
model.
Figure A2: Grandparent Households Labor Supply
Note:  Solid lines represent average hours from CPS and dashed lines represent average hours from model.
Note:  Solid lines represent average hours from CPS and dashed lines represent average hours from model.
Note: Solid lines represent average hours from CPS and dashed lines represent average hours from
model.
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Figure A3: Intergenerational Households Labor Supply
Note:  Top panels report optimal allocations averaged over all households. Bottom panels report optimal 
Note:  Solid lines represent average hours from CPS and dashed lines represent average hours from model.Note: Solid lines represent average hours from CPS and dashed lines represent average hours from
model.
Figure A4: Single Fathers Optimal Allocations
Note:  Top panels report optimal allocations averaged over all households. Bottom panels report optimal 
allocations with (τ = 1) and without (τ = 0) universal day care, averaged among households with children. 
Note: Top panels report optimal allocations averaged over all households. Bottom panels report
optimal allocations with (τ = 1) and without (τ = 0) formal day care subsidies, averaged among
households with children.
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Figure A5: Married Grandparents Optimal Allocations
Note:  Top panels report optimal allocations averaged over all households. Bottom panels report optimal 
allocations with (τ = 1) and without (τ = 0) universal day care, averaged among households with children. 
Note:  Top panels report optimal allocations averaged over all households. Bottom panels report optimal 
Note: Top panels report optimal allocations averaged over all households. Bottom panels report
optimal allocations with (τ = 1) and without (τ = 0) formal day care subsidies, averaged among
households with children.
Figure A6: Grandmother and Father Optimal Allocations
Note:  Top panels report optimal allocations averaged over all households. Bottom panels report optimal 
allocations with (τ = 1) and without (τ = 0) universal day care, averaged among households with children. 
Note:  Top panels report optimal allocations averaged over all households. Bottom panels report optimal 
allocations with (τ = 1) and without (τ = 0) universal day care, averaged among households with children. 
Note: Top panels report optimal allocations averaged over all households. Bottom panels report
optimal allocations with (τ = 1) and without (τ = 0) formal day care subsidies, averaged among
households with children.
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Figure A7: Grandfather and Mother Optimal Allocations
Note:  Top panels report optimal allocations averaged over all households. Bottom panels report optimal 
allocations with (τ = 1) and without (τ = 0) universal day care, averaged among households with children. 
Note:  Top panels report optimal allocations averaged over all households. Bottom panels report optimal 
allocations with (τ = 1) and without (τ = 0) universal day care, averaged among households with children. 
Note: Top anels r rt optimal allocations v rag d over all households. Bottom panels report
optimal allocations with (τ = 1) and without (τ = 0) formal day care subsidies, averaged among
households with children.
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